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INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1997, the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, on behalf
of the community group St. James Citizens for Jobs and the
Environment, filed an Environmental Justice Petition with the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA” or “Agency”)
requesting that the Agency revoke previously issued air permits for
Shintech, Inc.’s proposed polyvinyl-chloride (“PVC”) plant in St.
James Parish, Louisiana.1  Situated between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans, St. James Parish is in the heart of what is known as “Cancer
Alley.”2  St. James is a small community with a population that is over
80% black, where unemployment approaches 60%, and the average
yearly income is less than $5,000.3  Further exacerbating these
depressed socioeconomic conditions, St. James ranks third in the
state for highest industrial pollution levels with more than seventeen
million pounds released or transferred yearly.4
Unfortunately, the situation in St. James is not unique.  Empirical
evidence shows that toxic-waste dumps, municipal landfills, garbage
incinerators and similar noxious facilities are not randomly dispersed
throughout the country, but tend to be located in poor, minority
                                                 
1. See Environmental Justice Petition for the Denial of Shintech, Inc. Title V Air Permit
(Apr. 2, 1997) [hereinafter Environmental Justice Petition] (on file with the American University
Law Review).
2. “Cancer Alley” is an 85 mile stretch of the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and
New Orleans that is home to approximately 130 oil and chemical companies and waste dumps
that annually release more than 900 million pounds of toxins into the air, ground, and water.
See Environmental Protection Agency Cabinet Elevation—Environmental Equity Issues:  Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d
Cong. 21, 23 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr.); see also
Marcia Coyle, Saying “No” to Cancer Alley, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S5.  In light of the
exorbitant quantities of toxins released, the area has been described as a “massive human
experiment” and a “sacrifice zone.”  See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE 55-56 (1994)
(citing MICHAEL H. BROWN, LAYING WASTE:  THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS
152-61 (1987)); David Maraniss & Michael Weiskopf, Jobs and Illness in Petrochemical Corridor,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1987, at A1.  In the past several years, four towns along the river have
literally disappeared—bought out by Dow Chemical, Georgia Gulf, and Placid Oil—and their
inhabitants relocated.  See Coyle, supra, at S5.
3. See Paul Hoversten, EPA Puts Plant on Hold in Racism Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1997,
at A3 (referring to Convent, Louisiana, a town located within St. James Parish).
4. See Environmental Justice Petition, supra note 1, at 3-4 (citing 1994 Toxic Release
Inventory (“TRI”) data).
communities like St. James.5  In fact, the United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice found race to be the single most
important factor associated with the location of commercial
hazardous waste facilities.6
Since 1982, communities like St. James have begun fighting back,7
giving rise to the environmental justice movement.8  As an extension
of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1960s, the environmental
justice movement is about more than hazardous waste dumps or any
particular environmental issue.9  It is about social injustice and
                                                 
5. There have been numerous studies conducted on the incidence of race and pollution.
Two major studies are the 1983 General Accounting Office (“GAO”) study, see U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES [hereinafter GAO STUDY], and
the 1987 United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (“UCC”) study, see
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES:  A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY], discussed in
Richard Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”:  The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 801-02 (1993).  The GAO study examined four off-site
hazardous waste landfills in the eight southeastern states that comprise the EPA’s Region IV.
The study revealed that:  (1) blacks comprised the majority of the population in three of the
four communities where landfills were located and, (2) at least twenty-six percent of the
population in all four communities, most of whom were black, had incomes below the poverty
level.  See GAO STUDY, supra, at 2.
The UCC study examined the location of controlled and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites
across the United States.  The study found that:  (1) race proved more significant than
socioeconomic status in the siting of hazardous waste facilities, (2) in communities with two or
more operating hazardous waste facilities, the average minority population was three times that
of communities without such facilities, (3) in communities with just one active hazardous waste
facility the average minority population was twice that of communities without such facilities,
and (4) three out of every five blacks and Hispanics lived in communities with uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites.  See UCC STUDY, supra, at 801-02.
6. See UCC STUDY, supra note 5, at 801-02.
7. In 1982, citizens in Warren County, North Carolina gained national attention for their
protest of a proposed polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) landfill in their predominantly black
community.  This event is commonly viewed as the beginning of the environmental justice
movement.  See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 296 (1995) (noting that the Warren County protest “gave
credibility and momentum to [the] environmental justice movement”).
8. In addition to “environmental justice,” this issue is referred to as “environmental
racism” and “environmental equity.”  Although the three terms are frequently used
interchangeably, scholars and environmental justice advocates differentiate between them:
Environmental racism:  The term was first used by the Reverend Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr. in
1987, and refers to “a policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages
(whether intended or unintended) individuals or communities on the basis of race or color.”
See Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter
1993, at 23.
Environmental equity:  Environmental Equity refers to the equal enforcement and protection
of environmental laws. See BUNYAN BRYANT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:  ISSUES, POLICIES, AND
SOLUTIONS 5 (1995).  This term was adopted by the Bush Administration.  See Major Willie
Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks:  Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate
Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (1996).  Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of
the Deep South Center for Environmental Equity, further defines the term as the right “of all
people to benefit from the environment and to be equally protected from the effects of human
use and abuse of it.”  See id.
Environmental justice:  The term the Clinton Administration has adopted, and the term
Professor Bunyan Bryant defines as “those cultural norms and values, rules, regulations,
behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable communities, where people can
interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurturing, and productive.”  See BRYANT,
supra, at 6.
9. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:  The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 644 (1992) (suggesting that the environmental
patterns of institutional discrimination.10  Accordingly, the goals of
the movement parallel those of the Civil Rights Movement,
representing an integration of civil rights and environmental laws11
that may aptly be described as a quest for environmental civil rights.
This Comment discusses various means for achieving
environmental justice and concludes that community empowerment
strategies are the most effective.  Part I places the environmental
justice movement in the context of the struggle for social justice and
examines the underlying causes of environmental injustice.  Part I
then focuses on proposed solutions and critiques those proposals.
Part II examines the goals of community empowerment strategies
and looks to St. James Parish, Louisiana as an example of what an
empowered community can accomplish.  Part III examines the
effectiveness of community empowerment strategies and looks to the
Civil Rights Movement as precedent for such strategies.  Finally, in
conclusion, this Comment argues that community empowerment
strategies are the most effective means of achieving environmental
justice because they attack the root-cause of the problem, the
powerlessness of minority and poor communities.
I. THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXT
As noted above, the environmental justice movement is more than
an environmental movement.12  In fact, environmentalism, as most
Americans have come to describe it, is near the bottom of the
environmental justice movement’s priorities.13  Representing a
                                                 
justice movement addresses the process which results in pollution-generating facilities being
placed in poor and minority communities in addition to the levels of pollution produced by
those facilities).
10. Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr. observed:  “Sometimes we get too single-issue to see how
various social justice issues are interrelated.  But in this movement, there is a perception at the
grassroots level of how one manifestation of racial injustice is related to another.”  Marcia
Coyle, When Movements Coalesce, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10.  Likewise, Charles Lee, a
research director with the UCC believes that environmental racism is best viewed in its
historical context:
[T]he long history of oppression and exploitation of African-Americans, Hispanic-
Americans, Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans . . . has taken
the form of genocide, chattel slavery, indentured servitude, and racial discrimination
in employment, housing and practically all aspects of life in the United States.  We
suffer today from the remnant of this sordid history, as well as from new
institutionalized forms of racism.
ROBERT D. BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROTECTION:  ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR 286 (1994).
11. See Gunn, supra note 8, at 1227 (“[The] environmental justice movement attempts to
bridge [the] traditional civil rights movement with [the] mainstream environmental
movement.”).
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. This largely stems from a difference in perspective:  environmental groups are
concerned with leisure activities, wildlife, pollution abatement, and industrial regulation,
whereas environmental justice groups are concerned with civil rights, social equity, and
institutional discrimination.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 9; see also Alice Kaswan, Environmental
Justice:  Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice", 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 266
(1998) (noting that the agenda of the mainstream environmental movement reflects the
interests of its mostly white, well-educated, and middle-to-upper class members:  nature
merging of the civil rights and environmental movements, the
environmental justice movement symbolizes three of the world’s
greatest social dilemmas:  “the struggle against racism and poverty;
the effort to preserve and improve the environment; and the [] need
to shift social institutions from class division and environmental
depletion to social unity and sustainability.”14
In its quest for social justice, the environmental justice movement
must overcome the same fundamental obstacle faced by the Civil
Rights Movement:  powerlessness of poor and minority communities,
both economic and political.15  This powerlessness is the underlying
cause of environmental injustice, manifesting itself in (1) the
disproportionate siting of undesirable land uses16 in poor and
minority communities,17 and (2) the inequitable enforcement of
environmental laws in these communities.18  As such, two “superficial”
goals of the environmental justice movement are cleaning up existing
hazardous sites and preventing similar sites from developing in the
future.  However, neither goal can ultimately and satisfactorily be
accomplished without first remedying the underlying cause.  For an
environmental justice strategy to succeed, it must address and remedy
the powerlessness that created the problem; anything less will be
mere window dressing.
                                                 
preservation, outdoor recreational activities, and ambient environmental conditions).  In fact,
some minority leaders have gone so far as to describe mainstream environmentalism as
“‘irrelevant’ at best and, at worst, ‘a deliberate attempt by bigoted and selfish white middle-class
society to perpetuate its own values and protect its own life style at the expense of the poor and
underprivileged.’”  See Richard Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”:  The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (1993) (quoting James N. Smith, The
Coming of Age in American Society, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN
AMERICA 1 (James N. Smith ed. 1974)).
14. Gunn, supra note 8, at 1227.
15. Two types of political power are relevant to this problem.  The first type is expressed in
terms of a community’s ability to influence decision-makers.  The second type is represented by
the ability of individuals in a community to hold significant positions of influence in the
government.  See id. at 1250.  Overall, the poor and minorities lack both types.  Robert Bullard
notes that in spite of the progress made during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s,
minorities still remain underrepresented in government positions.  As a result, the interests of
the predominately white industrial boards, zoning commissions, and governmental regulatory
agencies will often run counter to those of minority communities.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at
26.  The effect is the “Not In My Backyard” (“NIMBY”) phenomenon, whereby wealthier
communities, whose interests are typically represented within the relevant decision-making
bodies, are able to influence the decision-making process and keep undesirable land uses out of
their communities.  As a result, such facilities are sited in disadvantaged communities.  See
discussion infra Part II.A.1 (addressing NIMBY and its effects on disadvantaged communities).
16. These undesirable land uses are typically termed “locally undesirable land uses”
(“LULUs”), and refer to land uses such as prisons, homeless shelters, and waste disposal
facilities that few people want in their community.  See generally Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to
Do With It?  Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 1001 (1993) (explaining the goal of environmental justice and the importance of a fair
siting program).
17. See GAO STUDY, supra note 5, at 2; UCC STUDY, supra note 5, at 801-02.
18. See Unequal Protection:  The Racial Divide in Environmental Protection, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S2-S8 [hereinafter Unequal Protection] (citing studies indicating that white communities
are more likely to receive preferred clean-up treatment than black communities); infra notes
123-29 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA’s inequitable enforcement of environmental
laws).
A. Pursuing Environmental Justice
To date, three primary means have been used to pursue
environmental justice:  litigation, legislation, and environmental
justice strategies developed by executive branch agencies pursuant to
Executive Order 12,898.19  Each of these strategies will be discussed in
turn.
1. Litigation strategies
Environmental justice litigation is “any litigation that seeks to
prevent or remedy, directly or indirectly, the disproportionate
burdens of environmental harm borne by people of color” and poor
people.20  To date, environmental justice litigation strategies have
focused on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and more recently, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
a. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally been one of the primary means for remedying racial
discrimination in this country.21  As such, it is not surprising that
equal protection claims form the basis of most environmental justice
lawsuits brought to date.22  However, the Equal Protection Clause has
proven less effective in remedying perceived environmental
injustices.  This is primarily due to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Washington v. Davis23 where the Court held that a showing of
discriminatory intent was necessary to prevail on equal protection
grounds.24  Under Washington and subsequent cases, in order to
prevail, plaintiffs must show that a “discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor” in the decision at issue.25
This burden has proven insurmountable for environmental justice
plaintiffs.26  To date, there have been several fully litigated cases in
                                                 
19. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1994 & Supp. I 1995) [hereinafter Executive Order] (outlining President Clinton’s
environmental justice policy).
20. See Gunn, supra note 8, at 1271-72.
21. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part:  “No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
see also Gunn, supra note 8, at 1272 (noting that in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means for remedying racial discrimination).
22. See infra note 27 (listing major equal protection cases brought in the environmental
justice context); see also Gunn, supra note 8, at 1272 (noting that equal protection claims have
been the legal hooks used in environmental justice lawsuits); Lazarus, supra note 13, at 829.
23. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
24. See id. at 238-48.
25. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977).  In Arlington Heights, the Court identified five factors that could be used to show
intentional discrimination:  (1) the impact of the action, (2) the historical background of the
decision, (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, (4) whether
there were any substantive or procedural departures from the standard decision-making
process, and (5) the legislative or administrative history of the challenged decision.
26. The Shintech controversy provides an excellent example of the difficulty of proving
discriminatory intent in the environmental context.  In refuting claims of environmental
racism, the plant’s Vice President of Manufacturing remarked that “Shintech’s siting decision
which plaintiffs sought to use the Equal Protection Clause to block an
environmental siting decision.27  In each case, plaintiffs were able to
show that a particular decision would adversely and
disproportionately affect their community, but were unable to show
that the decisions at issue constituted intentional discrimination.28
b. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The difficulties of proving discriminatory intent forced
environmental justice advocates to seek alternative avenues for
achieving their goals.  One strategy that may hold some promise of
success is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  The principal advantage of
Title VI is that individuals may pursue claims on the basis of disparate
impact, without a showing of discriminatory intent.
In applying Title VI to the environmental justice context, two
provisions are especially important, sections 601 and 602.29  Section
601 is the principal part of Title VI and provides that “no person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
                                                 
has been based upon its assessment of basic economic factors such as availability of raw
materials, direct access to deep water and access to rail transportation.”  Press Release,
Shintech, Inc. 2 (Mar. 28, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review).
This is not to say that equal protection claims will always fail.  Occasionally, the proverbial
“smoking-gun” is discovered, enabling plaintiffs to show the requisite intent.  For example, in a
case in Houston, Texas, plaintiffs brought suit alleging environmental racism by Gulf Oil for
knowingly permitting residential development atop abandoned, contaminated oil pits.  In that
case, plaintiffs relied on, inter alia, a 1967 Gulf Oil document that outlined the firm’s intention
to sell the property for “negro residential and commercial development.”  See Spotlight Story
Environmental Justice:  Latest Development Slows Down Key Trial, GREENWIRE, Sept. 8, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Grnwre File.
27. See R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding no evidence that
discriminatory intent motivated a government decision to build a solid waste facility in a
predominately black neighborhood); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibbs
County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding no evidence
that discriminatory intent motivated a government decision to build a solid waste facility in a
predominately black community); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10,
1982) (rejecting on similar grounds plaintiffs’ challenge to a proposed PCB disposal facility);
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (declining
to enjoin the siting of a solid waste facility near a predominately black high school and
residential area because plaintiffs failed to prove that the decision to grant a permit was
attributable to an intent to discriminate on the basis of race), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1986).
28. Illustrative of the problems faced in all three cases is that of Bean, the first
environmental justice case to be filed.  In Bean, the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the siting of
a solid waste disposal facility within their Houston, Texas community.  The plaintiffs’ claim
rested on two theories:  (1) that the state agency’s approval of the permit was part of a practice
of discriminating in the siting of such facilities, and (2) given the historical siting of such
facilities, that granting the permit constituted discrimination.  See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673-74.
Although the court found there was a disproportionate impact on minority communities, the
data presented was not sufficient to show discriminatory intent.  See id. at 677-80.
29. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir.
1997) (distinguishing between sections 601 and 602), vacated as moot, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).  A
plaintiff can challenge an action under Title VI in one of three ways:  (1) sue the discriminatory
recipient of federal funds, (2) sue the federal agency dispersing the funds, or (3) file a
complaint through the funding agency’s Title VI administrative process.  See James H. Colopy,
The Road Less Traveled:  Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 156-71 (1994) (explaining how each method can be used).
receiving Federal financial assistance.”30  The Supreme Court has
held, however, that section 601 only prohibits instances of intentional
discrimination.31
Section 602, requires federal agencies to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement section 601.32  In developing these
regulations, the Supreme Court has held that agencies may prohibit
certain disparate impacts as a condition for receipt of federal
assistance.33  Importantly, the EPA has adopted a disparate impact
standard in its Title VI regulations.34  Under these regulations,
facially-neutral policies or practices that result in discriminatory
effects are a violation of Title VI unless it can be shown that the
effects are justified and that there is no less discriminatory
alternative.35
                                                 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
31. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Chester, 132 F.3d at 929.
32. Section 602 provides in relevant part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of [section 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-1.
33. See Alexander , 469 U.S. at 293.
34. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998).  Section 7.35(b) provides:
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a
particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
Id.
35. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EPA, INTERIM
GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS 3
(1998) [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDANCE].
EPA’s Title VI implementing regulations enable individuals to bring suit under Title VI
through an administrative procedure.  See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1998).  To date, the EPA has
received 49 complaints alleging violations of Title VI in the environmental context.  See John
Chambers, The Supreme Court has Agreed to Take Up an Issue That has Stymied Regulators and Judges:
Waste Disposal Facilities Planned for Construction in Minority Areas, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at B6.
Recently, the Agency has received numerous complaints alleging discrimination in the
environmental permitting context.  To facilitate the processing of such complaints, the Agency
issued an Interim Guidance on February 4, 1998.  See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra; David Sive and
Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice Issues Develop, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at S1, S12.  The
purpose of the Interim Guidance is to provide a framework for processing complaints alleging
discriminatory effects resulting from the issuance of pollution control permits.  See INTERIM
GUIDANCE, supra, at 2.
The Interim Guidance sets forth the process that the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights (the
“OCR”) will follow in processing complaints alleging discrimination in permitting.  The OCR
will first determine whether the complaint establishes a valid claim.  Once the complaint is
accepted, the OCR will conduct a factual investigation to determine whether the permits at
issue create a disparate impact on a racial or ethnic population.  See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra,
at 4.  To determine whether a disparate impact exists, the OCR will conduct a five-step process:
(1) identify the affected population, (2) determine the demographics of the affected area, (3)
determine the universe of facilities and total affected populations, (4) conduct a disparate
impact analysis that will likely include a comparison of the racial or ethnic class within the
affected population and a comparison of the racial characteristics of the affected and non-
affected populations, and (5) determine whether the disparity is significant under Title VI.  See
id. at 8-9.
If the OCR makes an initial finding of disparate impact, it will notify the recipient of federal
financial assistance of its finding and provide the recipient with an opportunity to rebut the
finding, submit a plan for mitigating the disparate effects of the permit, or demonstrate that it
There are, however, at least three limitations to Title VI.  First, it
applies only to actions receiving federal funds.36  However, as federal
financial assistance in environmental protection is extensive,
establishing a sufficiently close federal financial nexus may prove
relatively simple.37  Second, in the absence of a showing of
discriminatory intent, it may only be possible to obtain declaratory or
injunctive relief.38
Third, and perhaps most important, is the issue of who may sue to
enforce section 601 and the agency implementing regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 602.  While the Supreme Court has
held that a private right of action exists under section 601,39 in light
of the Court’s recent decision in Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for
Quality Living,40 it is uncertain whether a private right of action exists
under section 602 that will enable private citizens to enforce the
EPA’s discriminatory effects regulations.41
                                                 
has a substantial, legitimate interest that justifies the decision to proceed with the permit.  See id.
at 4.  If the recipient fails to make one of these showings, the OCR will issue a preliminary
finding of noncompliance to the recipient that may include recommendations for the recipient
to achieve voluntary compliance.  See id. at 5.  If the recipient fails to implement the OCR’s
recommendations or submit a response showing that the OCR’s findings are incorrect or that
voluntary compliance can be achieved through other means, the OCR will issue a formal
determination of noncompliance.  See id.
If the recipient fails to come into voluntary compliance within ten days of receiving the
formal notice of noncompliance, the OCR may begin procedures to deny, annul, suspend, or
terminate EPA assistance in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b) and may refer the matter to
the Department of Justice for litigation.  See id.  
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
37. See Lazarus, supra note 13, at 835 (noting that federal environmental laws concerning
hazardous waste, toxic substances, water pollution control, and clean air provide extensive
federal assistance to state programs).
38. See Gunn, supra note 8 at 1284-85; Lazarus, supra note 13, at 836.  Professor Richard
Lazarus, however, argues that based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), a damages remedy may now be generally available
under Title VI.  See Lazarus, supra note 13, at 836.  In Franklin, the Court unanimously held that
a damages remedy is available in implied private rights of actions brought under Title IX of the
Education Acts Amendment of 1972.  See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74.  Lazarus argues that because
the language of Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and because the
Court has frequently relied on constructions of one in interpreting the other, that a damages
remedy may now be available absent a showing of discriminatory intent.  See Lazarus, supra note
13, at 836.
39. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Chester Residents for Concerned Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d
925, 929 (3d Cir. 1997).
40. 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).
41. Chester concerns the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s
(“PaDEP”) issuance of a permit to Soil Remediation Services (“SRS”)  to operate a waste facility
in the predominantly black city of Chester, Pennsylvania.  See 132 F.3d at 927.  Plaintiffs, a non-
profit corporation composed of residents of Chester, brought suit in federal court asserting that
the PaDEP’s issuance of the permit violated:  (1) section 601 of Title VI, (2) the EPA’s Title VI
regulations implemented pursuant to section 602, and (3) PaDEP’s assurance made pursuant to
the EPA’s Title VI regulations that it would not violate the regulations.  See id. at 927-28.
The district court dismissed the case holding that the Plaintiffs failed to show intentional
discrimination as required under section 601 and that there was no private right of action to
enforce the EPA’s Title VI regulations.  See id. at 928.  The Third Circuit, however, reversed and
held that a private right of action did exist under section 602.  See id. at 936.  Under the Third
Circuit’s holding, a private citizen would be able to bring suit to enforce the EPA’s Title VI
discriminatory effects regulations.
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the PaDEP’s petition for certiorari.  See  Seif v.
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (1998).  Shortly thereafter,
2. Proposed legislation
Although environmental justice issues were raised in the courts in
the 1970s,42 the issue was not debated by Congress until the 1990s,
with the proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1992.43  Despite a
slow start, environmental justice proposals now appear regularly on
the congressional agenda.44  This increase in proposed legislation
reflects the country’s growing concern with environmental justice.45
Unfortunately, Congress has not passed any environmental justice
legislation.
The first proposed environmental justice legislation was the
Environmental Justice Act of 1992 (the “1992 Act”).46  The 1992 Act
sought to require the EPA Administrator to identify the 100 counties
                                                 
however, the PaDEP revoked the SRS permit.  See Supremes Dismiss PA Waste Permit Case,
GREENWIRE, Aug. 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Grnwre File.  In a one sentence
opinion, the Supreme Court subsequently held that the case was moot and vacated the Third
Circuit’s decision.  See Chester, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).  The Court’s decision leaves standing the
district court decision that no private right of action exists under section 602.
Although the Supreme Court’s action reversed a holding that favored environmental justice
groups, it may be wise not to read anything further into this case for two primary reasons.  First,
the Court was persuaded to change its mind about hearing the case because there was no
longer a live controversy.  See Mary Greczyn, Supreme Court Calls Pa. Case “Moot”, WASTE NEWS,
Aug. 24, 1998, at 1.  Second, at least nine other circuit courts of appeals have adopted reasoning
similar to that of the Third Circuit in Chester.  See Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356
n.5 (6th Cir. 1996); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996); New York Urban
League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Elston v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ.,
997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988);
Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987); Latinos Unidos de
Chelsea v. HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard, 781
F.2d 456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986); Larry P. by Lucille v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir.
1984).  Accordingly, the question of whether a private right of action exists to enforce the EPA’s
Title VI regulations remains unanswered.
Even if the courts largely remain closed to environmental justice litigants, however, President
Clinton’s Executive Order may have brightened the prospects of Title VI in the environmental
justice context.  In the memorandum accompanying the Executive Order, President Clinton
directed federal agencies to ensure that entities receiving federal funds do not discriminate.  See
Memorandum from President William J. Clinton to Heads of all Departments & Agencies 30
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Memorandum on Environmental
Justice].  The memorandum states:
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, each Federal Agency shall
ensure that all programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance that affect
human health or the environment do not directly, or through contractual or other
arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that discriminate on the basis of
race, color, or national origin.
Id. at 280.   Major Willie Gunn argues that, given the Executive Order and the memorandum,
the Clinton Administration may offer a favorable political climate for environmental justice
plaintiffs to launch Title VI challenges through the administrative process.  See Gunn, supra note
8, at 1285-86.
42. See e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979).
43. See H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Rep. John Lewis of Georgia); see also
S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. of Tennessee).
44. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
45. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
xxxi (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that public concern for the environment is a catalyst for
profound changes in the law).
46. See id.  Representative Lewis reintroduced the legislation under the same name in 1993.
See H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993).  Both bills had the same underlying purpose:  “To establish a
program to assure nondiscriminatory compliance with all environmental, health and safety laws
and to assure equal protection of the public health.” Id.
containing the highest total weight of toxic chemicals47 and mandate
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services research the relative
nature and extent of adverse health impacts in those areas.48  In
addition, the 1992 Act called for a moratorium on the siting of new
hazardous waste facilities in these 100 “environmental high-impact
areas.”49  Finally, the 1992 Act provided for “technical assistance”
grants to individuals or groups in environmental high-impact areas.50
The second major environmental justice proposal was the
Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993 (the “1993 Act”),51 an act
which would have enabled citizens to petition against the
construction of solid waste management facilities in “environmentally
disadvantaged” communities.52  Under the 1993 Act, an Administrator
or state would have to grant a petition if petitioners established that:
(1) the proposed facility would be located in an “environmentally
disadvantaged” community; and (2) the proposed facility would
adversely affect human health or the air, soil, water, or other
elements within the community.53  Once petitioners established these
elements, an Administrator or state could only deny the petition if
the facility’s proponent demonstrated that:  (1) there was no
alternative that posed fewer risks; and (2) the proposed facility would
not release contaminants or engage in activities likely to increase the
cumulative impact of contaminants on residents.54
A third proposed environmental justice law is the Fair
Environmental Protection Act (“FEPA”).55  While FEPA has never
been incorporated into congressional legislation, a leading
environmental justice advocate, Robert Bullard, argues that Congress
should enact such a measure.56  FEPA would prohibit environmental
                                                 
47. See H.R. 5326, § 102(a).
48. See id. § 401.
49. See id. § 403.
50. See id. § 301.  The primary purpose of the grants was to facilitate access by
representatives of environmental high-impact areas to the public participation provisions of
relevant statutes.  See id.  The Environmental Justice Act of 1993 contained the same provision.
See H.R. 2105, § 301.
51. See H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Candice Collins of Illinois).
52. See id. § 3(a)(1).
53. See id. § 3(b)(2).
54. See id. § 3(b)(3).
55. See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 119, 126.  Proposals like FEPA are part of an
environmental justice framework developed by environmental justice advocates.  The goal of
the framework is to make environmental protection more democratic.  More importantly, it
attempts to bring to the forefront the ethical and political questions of  “who gets what, why,
and in what amount.”  See id. at 119.  The framework consists of five general characteristics:
(1) it follows the principle that all individuals have a right to be protected from environmental
degradation (FEPA fits within this principle), (2) it prefers the strategy of prevention (or
elimination of the threat before it occurs), (3) it shifts the burden of proof to polluters and
dischargers who harm, discriminate, or do not provide equal protection to disadvantaged
classes, (4) it allows disparate impact and statistical weight, as opposed to “intent,” to infer
discrimination, and (5) it redresses disproportionate impact through “targeted” action and
resources (directing resources to areas with the greatest need).  See id. at 119-21.  The
framework has three demands:  (1) enforcement in a nondiscriminatory manner, (2) legislative
initiatives generally, and (3) legislative initiatives directed at the states.  See id. at 126.
56. See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 119, 126.
discrimination on the basis of race.57  Modeled after various federal
civil rights acts that promote nondiscrimination,58 FEPA’s goals
include the elimination of unfair, unjust and inequitable decisions,
the creation of a right to environmental protection, not merely a
privilege, with the ultimate goal being the prohibition of
environmental discrimination on the basis of race.59
3. Executive Order 12,898
After achieving only modest success in the courts and suffering
repeated failures in Congress, the environmental justice movement
received its biggest boost on February 11, 1994, when President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, entitled “Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low
Income Populations” (the “Executive Order”).60  The Executive
Order requires each federal agency to develop strategies to achieve
environmental justice by “identifying and addressing . . . 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations.”61  At a minimum, these strategies
should:  (1) encourage enforcement of federal and state health and
environmental statutes in communities with high poor and minority
populations; (2) increase public involvement; (3) conduct more
accurate research and obtain more precise data regarding the health
and environment of poor and minority communities; and (4) analyze
disparities with respect to the use of natural resources by poor and
minority populations.62
Most significantly, the Executive Order emphasizes grassroots
community involvement.63  Environmental human health research
must include diverse segments of the population, including poor and
minority communities which may be exposed to substantial
environmental hazards.64  The Executive Order encourages the public
to submit recommendations to federal agencies relating to the
incorporation of environmental justice principles into agency
programs.65  In addition, certain public documents relating to human
health or the environment may be translated for minority
                                                 
57. See id.
58. The precedents for FEPA are the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  See id. at 119.
59. See id. at 119, 126.
60. Executive Order, supra note 19.
61. Id. § 1-101, at 859.
62. See id. § 1-103, at 860.  In developing and implementing their environmental justice
strategies, each federal agency must ensure that their programs or policies “do not have the
effect of excluding persons (including populations) from participation in, denying persons
(including populations) the benefits of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to
discrimination under, such programs, policies, and activities, because of their race, color, or
national origin.”  Id. § 2-2, at 861.
63. See id.
64. See id. § 3-301(a), at 861.
65. See id. § 5-5(a), at 862.
communities,66 and each agency must ensure that important
documents, notices, and hearings are concise, understandable, and
readily available to the public.67  A memorandum following the
Executive Order directs each federal agency to provide opportunities
for community input in the National Environmental Policy Act68
(“NEPA”) process, including consultation with affected communities
and improving the accessibility of meetings, crucial documents, and
notices.69  Although the Executive Order represents a significant
achievement for the environmental justice movement, its efficacy is
still to be determined.70  In fact, since none of its provisions allows for
judicial review, it ultimately risks failure.71
4. The EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy
Pursuant to the President’s Executive Order, the EPA developed an
environmental justice strategy aimed at integrating environmental
justice into the Agency’s programs and policies.72  The stated goal is
to ensure that “[n]o segment of the population, regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income, as a result of the EPA’s policies,
                                                 
66. See id. § 5-5(b), at 862.
67. See id. § 5-5(c), at 862.
68. 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4370a (1994).  NEPA was signed into law on January 1, 1970, by
President Richard Nixon.  NEPA set forth the nation’s environmental policy and established as
the “continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans.”  Id. § 4331(a).  NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare
an environmental impact statement addressing the likely effects of their activities.  Specifically,
the principal section, section 102, requires that all federal agencies:
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on--(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
Id. § 4332(c).
69. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, supra note 41, at 280.
70. This assertion is true for two reasons.  First, the Executive Order was promulgated only
five years ago.  Second, many important aspects of the Executive Order remain undefined.  The
resulting ambiguity has proven to be especially difficult in the current Shintech controversy.  See
infra Part II.D (discussing the Shintech, Inc. controversy).  Critics of the EPA’s handling of the
conflict decry the fact that “the EPA has no rules or regulations on environmental justice, yet
insists on enforcing the idea.”  Civil Rights Not the Role of EPA, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 23,
1997, at B6.  This lack of definitions and regulations has made it extremely complicated to
interpret and apply terms such as “disproportionately high and adverse.”
71. See Executive Order, supra note 19, § 6-609, at 863 (stating explicitly that the Executive
Order is only intended to improve internal management of the Executive Branch and does not
create any right or benefit enforceable at law or equity).  This lack of enforceability could have
two effects.  First, future administrations may be able to disregard it without having to take
formal steps to repeal it.  Second, the lack of independent enforceability leaves entrenched
bureaucrats to implement the Executive Order.  See Willie Hernandez, Environmental Justice:
Looking Beyond Executive Order 12,898, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 181, 206 (1995/96).  As
poor and minority communities are underrepresented in such positions, they are not likely to
see any drastic changes.  See id. at 207.
72. OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUSTICE., U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY:  EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12,898, at 2 (1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY].
programs, and activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse
human health or environmental effects, and all people live in clean,
healthy, and sustainable communities.”73
In accordance with the Executive Order’s emphasis on grassroots
community involvement, the EPA based its strategy on three guiding
principles:  (1) environmental justice begins and ends in
communities; (2) helping affected communities gain access to
information will enable them to participate meaningfully in activities;
and (3) effective leadership will advance environmental justice.74
Following these principles, the EPA developed an approach focused
on establishing common sense standards and procedures for
conducting the Agency’s programs.75  This “Common Sense”
Initiative76 attempts to bring together communities,
environmentalists, industry, states, tribes, and others to develop
cleaner, cheaper, and smarter solutions to environmental problems.77
Along with four other mission topics, the Common Sense Initiative
focuses on “public participation, accountability, partnerships, and
communication with stakeholders.”78  Based on the realization that
effective environmental justice strategies require early involvement by
affected communities and other stakeholders, the Agency will actively
seek to incorporate the expertise of local, affected community
members throughout this process.79
Foremost among the EPA’s projects to address and remedy
environmental injustice is its Brownfields program.80  The program is
designed to address the problems associated with abandoned
commercial and industrial properties (known as “brownfields”),
which are located overwhelmingly in minority and poor
                                                 
73. Id. at 1.
74. See id. at 2.
75. See id. at 4.
76. In an introductory letter to the EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy, EPA Administrator
Carol Browner explains that “[e]arly involvement and strong partnerships, founded on mutual
respect and understanding, make good common sense and will result in sound public health and
environmental policy.”  Carol Browner, Introductory Letter, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY,
supra note 72.  Accordingly, the EPA refers to its environmental justice strategy as “The
Common Sense Initiative.”  See id. at 4.
77. See id.
78. Id.  The other four mission topics are:  (1) health and environmental research; (2) data
collection, analysis, and stakeholder access to public information; (3) American Indian and
indigenous environmental protection; and (4) enforcement, compliance assurance, and
regulatory reviews.  See id.
79. See id. at 6.
80. See NATIONAL ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
REPORT ON THE PUBLIC DIALOGUES ON URBAN REVITALIZATION AND BROWNFIELDS 2 (1995)
[hereinafter NEJAC REPORT].  The findings in the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council Report (“NEJAC Report”) are derived from a series of public hearings conducted by
the EPA and the NEJAC entitled “Public Dialogues on Urban Revitalization and Brownfields:
Envisioning Healthy and Sustainable Communities.”  See id. at 1.  The report notes that the
existence of such degraded and hazardous physical environments in disadvantaged
communities has contributed to “human disease and illness, negative psycho-social impact,
economic disincentive, infrastructure decay, and overall community disintegration.”  See id. at 2.
The Brownfields program is designed to remedy these problems.  See id.
communities.81  The EPA hopes this program will:  stem the
environmentally damaging and racially divisive phenomenon of
urban sprawl and Greenfields development; focus on problems that
are inextricably linked with environmental justice; allow communities
to offer their vision for redevelopment; apply environmental justice
principles to the development of a new environmental policy; and
provide greater awareness of and opportunities for partnership-
building between the EPA and affected communities and other
stakeholders.82
The Brownfields program clearly embodies the Executive Order’s
emphasis on grassroots community involvement.83  By making a
concerted effort to work with community groups, investors, lenders,
developers, and other affected parties, the Brownfields program
recognizes that communities directly affected by a problem or project
are imminently qualified to participate in the decision-making
process.84  By providing services such as training and support for
community groups and technical assistance grants, the Brownfields
program seeks to establish mechanisms to ensure the full and
meaningful participation of all affected parties.85
By actively seeking community input and involvement, the
Brownfields program, in theory, enables poor and minority
communities to influence the decision-making process; thus,
addressing the problem of powerlessness by providing these
disadvantaged communities with a modicum of political
empowerment.86
B. Analyzing and Critiquing Proposed Strategies
1. The problems with litigation strategies
Although litigation has proven extremely successful in remedying
past instances of racial discrimination,87 there are two principal
weaknesses to its potential effectiveness in the environmental justice
                                                 
81. See NEJAC REPORT, supra note 80, at 2; see also GAO STUDY, supra note 5, at 2; UCC
STUDY, supra note 5, at 801-02.
82. See id. at 1-2.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 3.
85. Public participation and community involvement are deemed essential to any effort in
remedying environmental injustice.  In its report, the NEJAC offered several recommendations,
foremost among them was the need for informed and empowered community involvement.  See
id. at 3.  The NEJAC stressed that “[e]arly, ongoing, and meaningful public participation is the
hallmark of sound public policy and decision making.”  Id.
86. The Brownfields program has achieved several important successes.  By March 1996,
the EPA had awarded 40 grants to Brownfields pilot projects to encourage development of
these contaminated properties.  Additionally, the EPA has removed 27,000 sites from its
inventory of potential Superfund sites (The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act).  See PERCIVAL, supra note 45, at 300-01.  The effectiveness of
the initiative in the environmental justice context, however, remains suspect, as the discussion
below will indicate.  See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
87. See, e.g, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (banning segregation according to
race in public schools).
context.  The first weakness is that traditional means of remedying
discrimination, such as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, are not
readily applicable in the environmental justice context.  The high
burden of proving discriminatory intent has, in effect, nullified the
Equal Protection Clause.88  Likewise, although Title VI holds some
promise, it is still uncertain whether plaintiffs must show
discriminatory intent when not bringing suit under a federal agency’s
Title VI implementing regulations89 and whether plaintiffs can
recover damages absent a showing of discriminatory intent.90
The second weakness is that taking environmental justice problems
out of the streets and into court may actually be to a community’s
disadvantage.91  Luke Cole, an attorney with the California legal
Assistance Foundation, argues that in struggles between polluters and
communities, “two types of power exist:  the power of money and the
power of people.”92  Typically, polluters have the money while
communities have the people.  By taking the struggle to the
courtroom where polluters can bring in the best experts money can
buy, the community is taking the struggle off the streets where it has
the most power.93
Similarly, in bringing the struggle to court and away from
community activists and the people, Cole argues the litigation
strategy fails to alter the structure of power relations that created the
problem in the first place.94  As environmental laws are a product of a
process that has traditionally excluded poor and minority peoples,
working within the system will tend to strengthen, rather than
challenge, institutions that work against these disadvantaged classes.95
                                                 
88. See supra Part I.A.1.a (discussing the requirement that discriminatory intent be shown
in equal protection claims and the difficulty of showing this intent in the environmental justice
context).
89. See supra note 41 (discussing Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d
925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998)).
90. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).  Despite the potential limitations, many argue that civil rights
challenges should continue because environmental justice issues are inherently civil rights
issues.  Professor Lazarus observes:  “The point is not just that environmental laws need to be
enforced but that there is a civil rights problem in the environmental area.”  Marcia Coyle,
Lawyers Try to Devise New Strategy, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S8.  According to solo practitioner
Michael Daniel, individuals and organizations can win environmental justice cases:  “There are
two or three stinking little cases that have people throwing up their hands and saying they can’t
do it,” adding that civil rights advocates initially faced setbacks in the courts involving voting
rights and housing and school desegregation.  See id.
91. See Cole, supra note 9, at 650 (arguing that taking environmental problems to court
plays to the community’s “weakest suit”).
92. Id.
93. See id.  The cost of preparing and presenting an effective case may also prove
prohibitive, thus decreasing the probability of a favorable verdict for the affected communities.
94. See id. at 648-49.  Additionally, minorities and the poor have a profound skepticism of
the law’s potential because throughout the history of the United States the law has been used to
oppress the poor and minorities by depriving them of their land, denying them the right to
vote, and rejecting their status as full citizens.  See id. at 647.
95. See id. at 652.
The siting of facilities is a political problem, not a legal one.96  Thus,
strategies that focus on remedying the political powerlessness of these
communities are the preferred choice.97
2. The problems with legislation
Although environmental injustice is inherently a “political”
problem, Congress is not the appropriate body to remedy the
problem.98  The difficulty in passing legislation goes to the central
issue of environmental injustice--the political and economic
powerlessness of minority and poor communities:  Who will speak on
behalf of the interests of the disadvantaged when environmental
justice legislation comes before Congress?  As the poor and
minorities are underrepresented in virtually every sector of
government,99 no significant and meaningful support will come from
such institutions.100  The failure of the legislative initiatives bears
witness to this.
Thus, in order to affect the political process, the environmental
justice movement must develop strategies that empower local
communities and enable them to exert pressure on the political
decision-making process.  The result will likely be similar to that of
the Civil Rights Movement where communities, empowered by
                                                 
96. See id. at 648 (explaining that siting is a political problem because the government
must issue permits to polluters giving them the right to pollute).
97. In arguing against litigation strategies and for community involvement, Luke Cole
suggests that a litigation strategy “teaches the community that the community is not smart
enough to solve the problem itself.”  Coyle, supra note 90, at S8; see also Cole, supra note 9, at
648 (“Using a legal strategy, rather than a political one, would likely fail these [poor and
minority] communities.”).
98. In his testimony before the House Legislation and National Security Subcommittee,
Robert Bullard remarked that “the solution to the types of problems discussed today is
decidedly not more federal power, nor a new federal cause of action.”  Hearings, supra note 2, at
82 .  He argues that “[t]o the extent that disparities occur among communities, those disparities
will likely occur whenever the decisionmaker is removed from the community.  What is called
for is a return of these types of decisions to the community or at least to the closest level of
government to the problem.”  Id.
99. For example, in 1995, the 104th Congress included 40 black Representatives (9%), 17
Hispanic Representatives (4%), and four Asian-Pacific Islander Representatives (.9%).  In the
Senate, there was one black Senator (1%), zero Hispanic Senators, and one Asian, Pacific
Islander Senator (1%).  See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS -
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS:  1981 TO 1995, reprinted in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1997 No. 448.  The dearth of
minority representation in government is perhaps best illustrated by the employee breakdown
within the federal executive branch.  In 1995, there were 1,960,577 total executive branch
employees.  Of these, 1,394,690 (71%) were white, 327,302 (17%) were black, and 115,964
(6%) were Hispanic.  See id. at No. 538.  Although the total Hispanic and black representations
nearly mirror the composition of the country’s population, when one examines the upper levels
of the executive branch, a different picture emerges.  For example, of the 327,302 blacks, only
24,448 (7%) were in payment Grades 13-15 ($48,878-$88,326) and only 942 (.2%) were in
Senior pay levels.  See id.  Similarly, of the 115,964 Hispanics, 10,473 (9%) were in Grades 13-15
and only 382 (.3%) were in Senior pay levels.  See id.  Thus, although minorities as a whole are
well-represented in the federal government, they are greatly underrepresented in upper-level
positions where most of the decision-making takes place.
100. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice:  Weighing Race and Class as
Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 924 (1992) (noting
that underrepresentation in governing bodies translates into limited contact with policy-makers
as well as a lack of advocacy for minority interests).
grassroots organizations, enabled underrepresented interests to exert
pressure on elected officials, resulting in the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.101  Although legislative solutions may eventually
prove effective, without significant representation in the decision-
making process, any legislation that is passed may prove too “watered-
down” to be of any effect.102
3. The EPA’s “Common Sense” Initiative
The EPA’s “Common Sense” Initiative comes closest to addressing
the underlying problem of powerlessness by actively soliciting input
from in the decision-making process.103  In theory, this strategy
enables individuals and communities to have a voice and potentially
influence the decision-making process.104  Despite such an initiative,
however, the EPA’s history suggests that its commitment to
environmental justice remains suspect.105  This is perhaps best
illustrated by the fact that the EPA does not regard Executive Order
12,898 as adding substantive environmental justice requirements to
existing statutes and regulations.106  When the principal agency in the
environmental justice debate summarily dismisses such a significant
accomplishment of the movement, the possible effectiveness of any
strategy developed by that agency must be seriously questioned.
                                                 
101. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a- 2000h (1994).
102. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing two environmental justice laws
adopted by the Louisiana State Legislature and how the second law was “watered down” to gain
passage).
103. See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note 72, at 4.
104. See id.
105. See generally Unequal Protection, supra note 18, at S1-S8 (discussing the EPA’s inequitable
enforcement of environmental laws).  As a result of such inequitable treatment, the EPA may
have lost the support and trust of communities most in need of its assistance.  In her testimony
before the House Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Dr. Beverly Wright, Director
of the Deep South Center for Environmental Equity, observed that “ineffective responses to
environmental problems by [the] government have resulted in serious distrust by communities
of those agencies, the EPA included, responsible for the health and safety of the public.”
Hearings, supra note 2, at 124 (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright).
Additionally, minorities are not well represented within the EPA.  Although accounting for
26.8% of the total workforce at the EPA, minorities are, again, grossly underrepresented in
positions of authority.  In fact, there is a direct correlation between Grade (government service
pay level) and minority representation:  at Grade 1, minorities account for 82.4% of employees
compared with 17.6% for whites; at Grade 8, minorities account for 53.7% of employees
compared with 46.3% for whites; at Grade 10, minorities account for 35.4% of employees
compared with 64.6% for whites; at Grade 15, minorities account for 9.2% of employees
compared with 90.8% for whites; and at Senior pay levels, minorities account for 7.9% of
employees compared with 92.1% for whites.  See OFFICE OF WORKFORCE INFORMATION, U.S.
EPA, RACE/NATIONAL ORIGIN DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT tbl.2 (1996)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
106. See Julie R. Domike & Arthur W. Ray, EPA, Courts Focus on Title VI Issues in Locating
Industrial Plants in Low-Income Areas, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at C1.  In In re Chemical Waste
Management of Indiana, Inc., 1995 WL 395962 (EPA June 29, 1995), the EPA’s Environmental
Appeals Board (“EAB”) held that “‘the Executive Order does not purport to, and does not have
the effect of, changing the substantive requirements for issuance of a permit under RCRA
[Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] and its implementing regulations.’”  See Chemical
Waste Management, 1995 WL 395962, at *4.  In short, if the applicant meets the requirements of
the applicable statute, the EPA must issue the permit, regardless of the racial or socioeconomic
composition of the surrounding community or the effect of the facility on the surrounding
community.  See id.  EPA Administrator Carol Browner followed this reasoning in denying the
environmental justice petition filed in the Shintech case.  See infra note 174.
Instead, what is needed is a strategy that enables a community to
take control of the struggle itself, without having to rely on the
government’s good faith to include it in the decision-making
process.107  A community empowerment strategy is just this type of
strategy.108  The remainder of this Comment examines community
empowerment strategies and attempts to show why such strategies are
the most effective means of achieving social justice.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES
A. The Path of Least Resistance
Community empowerment strategies must play a prominent role in
any environmental justice strategy because they are the most effective
means of addressing the root-cause of environmental injustice:
economic and political powerlessness.  As noted above, this
powerlessness makes poor and minority communities the “path of
least resistance,” which has two principal effects:  (1) a
disproportionate number of “locally undesirable land uses”
(“LULUs”) are sited there;109 and (2) once sited, enforcement of
environmental laws at these facilities is lax, resulting in the creation
of toxic “hot-spots” in these communities.110
1. The problem of siting:  NIMBY
The most vivid manifestation of economic and political
powerlessness is the NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”) syndrome.111
                                                 
107. Stephen Wexler of the National Welfare Rights Organization observed:  “‘Poverty will
not be stopped by people who are not poor.  If poverty is stopped, it will be stopped by poor
people.  And poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it together.’” See Cole, supra note
9, at 649 (quoting Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053
(1970)).  The analogy to the environmental justice context is clear:  the problems of pollution
will not be stopped by people who are not being polluted.  Environmental degradation will only
be stopped by its victims and only if they work together.
108. The term “community empowerment” is used to denote the organization of grassroots
groups; it is a bottom-up approach that seeks to influence the decision-making process by
organizing and empowering communities.  The EPA’s “Common Sense” Initiative uses the term
empowerment, but this is essentially a top-down approach—the government allows
communities to participate in the process.  See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note
72, at 18 (discussing empowerment strategies within the Brownfields program).
109. See GAO STUDY, supra note 5, at 2 (observing that hazardous waste landfills were
disproportionately located in poor and minority communities); UCC STUDY, supra note 5, at
801-02 (finding that race played a significant role in the location of commercial hazardous
waste facilities).
110. See generally Unequal Protection, supra note 18, at S1-S12 (comparing the enforcement of
environmental laws, response time, and penalties between poor and minority areas and wealthy
areas).
111. Major Willie A. Gunn gives six explanations for environmental injustice:  (1) relative
lack of political power; (2) economics; (3) lack of participation in the environmental
movement; (4) racism; (5) NIMBY; and (6) segregated housing and immobility.  See Gunn,
supra note 8, at 1247-51.  It is this author’s opinion that reason five, NIMBY, is a product of
reasons one through four.  Clearly, minority and poor communities lack economic and political
power, thereby affecting their ability to influence decision-makers.  Similarly, their lack of
participation in the environmental movement further contributes to their inability to influence
decisions on the siting of facilities.  Finally, many interpret NIMBY as an embodiment of racism,
an interpretation supported by the findings of the GAO and UCC studies.  See BULLARD, supra
Traditionally, NIMBY has been used by affluent sectors of society to
block the siting of LULUs in their communities.112  These
communities are effective at blocking LULUs primarily because:  (1)
they are able to expend the necessary resources;113 and (2) politicians
typically relate to these communities and are thus more sensitive to
their needs and desires.114
When these communities say “Not In My Backyard,” developers
turn their attention to communities where opposition is less
organized and less powerful—poor and minority communities.115  In
fact, some have labeled this response by developers and political
officials the “PIBBY principle”—"Place in Black’s Backyard.”116
Regardless of how it is characterized, the result is clear:  because poor
and minority communities are unable to muster sufficient resistance
to the siting of LULUs, these undesirable facilities end up in their
neighborhoods.117
                                                 
note 2, at 83-84 (“[L]and use decisions are quite revealing of status hierarchies (race and class)
favoring whites and the affluent over the poor and people of color.”); GAO STUDY, supra note 5,
at 2; UCC STUDY, supra note 5, at 801-02.
112. See Gunn, supra note 8, at 1249.
113. See id. (noting that poor communities will usually lack the financial resources to resist
the siting of unwanted facilities); Mohai & Bryant, supra note 100, at 924 (“Communities where
hazardous waste sites are located tend to be communities in which residents are unaware of the
policy decisions affecting them, [and the] residents are unorganized and lack resources for
taking political action.”).  For example, a consultant’s report regarding the siting of three
incinerators proposed by the City of Los Angeles contained the following advice:
Certain types of people are likely to participate in politics, either by virtue of their
issue awareness or their financial resources, or both.  Members of middle or higher-
socioeconomic strata . . . are more likely to organize into effective groups to express
their political interests and views.  All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the
nearby siting of major facilities, but the middle and upper-socioeconomic strata
possess better resources to effectuate their opposition.
. . . [A]lthough environmental concerns cut across all subgroups, people with a college
education, young or middle-aged, and liberal in philosophy are most likely to organize
opposition to the siting of a major facility.
Been, supra note 16, at 1002-03 n.6 (citing J. Stephen Powell, Cerrell Associates, Political
Difficulties Facing Waste to Energy Conversion Plant Siting, Report to the California Waste
Management Board 42-43 (1984)).  The consultants then “recommended that ‘communities
that conform to some kind of economic need criteria should be given high priority’ and that
officials should look for ‘lower socioeconomic neighborhoods’ that were also in ‘a heavy
industrial area with little, if any, commercial activity.’”  Id. (citing Dick Russell, Environmental
Racism, 11 Amicus J. 22, 25-26 (1989) (quoting Cerell Associates )).
114. Robert Bullard argues that those communities capable of mobilizing political influence
greatly improve their chances of “winning” the NIMBY war.  Because minorities are
underrepresented in political office, they must rely on officials who may not understand the
nature and severity of the problems confronting the community.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at
131-32.
115. See Cole, supra note 9, at 646.
116. See id. at 647.  The GAO and UCC studies support this assertion—if not PIBBY, then at
least PIMBY (“Place in Minorities’ Backyard”).  See GAO STUDY, supra note 5; UCC STUDY, supra
note 5.
Robert Bullard addresses another interesting problem that NIMBY poses for blacks.  He
asserts that it has been difficult for many blacks to say “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” because they do
not have a backyard.  He notes that nationally, only about 44% of blacks own their own homes,
compared with 66% for society as a whole.  As homeowners are the strongest advocates of
NIMBY, blacks are clearly at a disadvantage.  See BRYANT, supra note 8, at 80.
117. Another contributing factor to the disproportionate number of LULUs in poor and
minority communities is “job blackmail.”  Because of their economic weaknesses, poor and
minority communities are often willing to deal with the increased pollution in the hopes of
obtaining economic benefits from the facility—the jobs vs. environment debate.  See BULLARD,
NIMBY and the resultant problem of siting are harmful to poor
and minority communities for reasons beyond that of pollution.118
First, LULUs engender a sense of unfairness because they tend to
gravitate toward disadvantaged communities, thereby making those
communities worse places to live.119  Second, NIMBY has operated to
insulate non-minority and affluent communities from the adverse
impacts of solid waste facilities while simultaneously providing them
with benefits, such as garbage disposal.120  This has led Robert Bullard
to argue that NIMBY creates and perpetuates privileges for affluent
communities at the expense of poor and minority communities.121
2. The problem of enforcement
The problems that lead to the siting of LULUs in poor and
minority communities also contribute to the lax enforcement of
environmental laws once the facilities are sited.122  In 1992, the
                                                 
supra note 10, at 55.  To these communities, the prospect of jobs is something real and tangible,
whereas potential environmental risks are something unknown.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at
27.  An excellent example of this mentality is, again, the proposed Shintech plant in St. James
Parish, Louisiana.  A large percentage of the population (there is some debate as to whether
the majority of the community is for or against the facility), including the state chapter of the
NAACP, is pro-Shintech primarily for economic reasons.  Among the reasons given by the
Citizens of Freetown, a grassroots group in favor of the plant, is that the plant will bring job
opportunities and residual economic benefits, as well as “provid[e] hope and financial security
for many Freetown families.”  See Gladys Maddie, Letter to the Editor, NEWS-EXAMINER, Apr. 24,
1997, at 2.  Given these possibilities, the group concluded that the potential economic infusion
far outweighed any potential environmental effects.  Letter from Carol A. Gaudin, Citizens of
Freetown, to J. Dale Givens, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 2 (Apr.
21, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review).
118. Pollution, however, is obviously a major concern.  More so than lax enforcement,
NIMBY and the resulting problem of siting may have the most serious environmental
ramifications.  Even if all the facilities in the area are in perfect compliance with every
environmental regulation, severe health hazards may still exist.  In his statement to the House
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Rep. John Lewis of Georgia offered the
following insight:
[Y]ou can have a paper mill in a community that is in full compliance with all
environmental laws, and then have an incinerator in that community that is in
compliance, and a dry cleaning operation that is in compliance, and so forth and so
on.  But together, the paper mill, the incinerator, and the dry cleaning may be killing
the community.  People need to know that.  They have a right to know.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Rep. Lewis).  Similarly, in his testimony, Bunyan
Bryant summed up the problem as follows:  “And in cancer alley you have all of the
corporations each dumping hundreds and thousands of pounds of chemicals into the air and
the water and the EPA and the State government issuing permits as if that is the only company
that is doing it.  There’s no concern about the cumulative effect.”  Id. at 96 (statement of
Bunyan Bryant).
119. See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 37.
120. See id. at 131.
121. See id.; see also Kaswan, supra note 13, at 272-73 (noting that the process "feeds on itself"
in that zoning laws perpetuate these problems because when noxious facilities are already
located in an area, additional similar facilities will be considered consistent with existing uses).
122. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the low minority representation
in positions of authority within the EPA).  Robert Bullard argues that this underrepresentation
“has no doubt affected the outcomes of some important environmental decisions in at-risk
communities.”  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 101.  The effects of this underrepresentation of
minorities within the EPA are further exacerbated by their lack of representation in mainstream
environmental groups.  Thus, minorities are essentially denied a voice from the inside of the
primary political process and from the outside.  As they have no means of fighting for their
interests, the resulting lax enforcement in minority communities should come as no surprise.
See id. at 133.
National Law Journal conducted a study of the EPA’s enforcement
practices and found there to be a significant enforcement gap
between predominately white communities and predominately
minority communities.123  Among other things, the study found that:
(1) hazardous waste sites in minority communities took 20% longer
to get placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List than those in white
communities;124 (2) clean-up projects began approximately 42% later
in minority communities than in white communities;125 (3) penalties
against polluters in low-income communities were 54% lower than
for wealthier communities;126 (4) a 500% disparity in fines levied
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act existed between
white and minority communities;127 and (5) the Clean Air Act
enforcement cases were overwhelmingly brought in white
communities.128  These findings strongly suggest that unequal
environmental protection places minority communities at special
risk.129
                                                 
123. See Unequal Protection, supra note 18, at S1-S2 (concluding that “disparity under the toxic
waste law occurs by race alone, not income”).
124. See id. at S1, S4.
125. See id. at S4.
126. See id. at S2.
127. See id.
128. See id. at S12.  This is true despite the fact that greater numbers of minorities are
exposed to air pollution than are whites.  Major Willie A. Gunn argues that this disparity may be
explained by the relative political clout and activism of white communities as opposed to
minority communities.  See Gunn, supra note 8, at 1245 n.129.
129. Two examples are sufficient here.  First, studies have shown that exposure to air
pollutants increases the risk of respiratory illness in children.  The State of Maryland conducted
a study that examined the rates of hospitalization for asthma among children in relation to race
and socioeconomic status.  The study found that black children were three times more likely to
be hospitalized for asthma than white children.  See Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of
Adolfo Correa-Villasenor, M.D., Ph.D.).  Although white-black differentials in exposure to
pollutants were not examined as possible explanations or contributory factors, given the
disproportionate siting of facilities and lax enforcement in minority communities, this would
seem a likely explanation.  See id.  The problems created by increased exposure to pollutants are
further exacerbated by the difficulties poor and minorities face in obtaining adequate health
care.  See Cole, supra note 9, at 630 n.32 (noting that only 42% of people below the poverty level
received Medicaid; that many doctors have not been trained to recognize environmental illness,
and thus, those ill from pollution or other poisoning might not be properly diagnosed; and that
doctors who treat poor, minority, and rural residents often have fewer resources at their
disposal and therefore less care to offer their patients).
Second, numerous studies also indicate that minorities are disproportionately affected by
lead poisoning.  For example, the United States Centers for Disease Control has found that the
percentage of lead poisoning victims was 30% higher among black children than among white
children.  See Lead Poisoning:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 23-25 (1992) (statement of John H. Adams,
Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council) (asserting that the effects of lead
poisoning are serious).  In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, Adams observed that:
Lead poisoning strikes at the heart of the ability of children to improve their lot. . . .
These children are at a greater risk of poor academic achievement and dropping out
of school and some experts believe these kids ultimately are at greater risk of
committing crimes because of neurologic and behavioral dysfunctions caused or
exacerbated by lead poisoning.
Id. at 27.
B. The Public Choice Process
The public choice process provides an excellent illustration of why
the interests of poor and minority communities are largely ignored
on the institutional level.  Debunking the myth that the public choice
process is open to everyone, Professor Denis J. Brion argues that
political experiences suggest that decisions can often be explained by
a perceived hierarchy of power, where wealthy communities are not
subjected to LULUs while poorer communities are.130  The question
then is:  why does the public choice process produce such inequitable
results?  Brion provides two answers:  (1) the operation of
government precludes groups with fewer resources from fair
consideration of their interests, and (2) the personal agendas of
decision-makers often prevent objective decision-making.131
Addressing the first point, Brion argues that to participate
adequately in the public choice process, two types of resources are
required.132  The first type includes resources that enable
participation, such as time, negotiation and presentation skills, and a
thorough understanding of the workings of and interplay among the
various governmental entities involved.133  In theory, anyone may
acquire these resources.  In practice, however, the cost of acquiring
them frequently prevents participation—the classic collective action
problem.134
The second type of resource is one that comprises the substance of
participation.135  This substance consists of both advocacy for a
particular outcome and the information necessary to make an
informed decision.136  Brion contends that because decision-makers
are frequently uninformed on a particular issue, they rely solely on
people—such as industry representatives—who have the information
readily available, thereby further prejudicing the decision-making
process.137
Inequitable results also can be attributed to the personal agenda of
politicians and bureaucrats.  Due to the very nature of their
                                                 
130. See Denis J. Brion, An Essay On LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 440 (1988).
131. See id. at 443-44; Hernandez, supra note 71, at 192 (discussing Brion's answers as to why
the public choice process produces inequitable results).  The first reason represents both
economic and political powerlessness while the second represents only the latter.  In essence,
the public choice process exacerbates and perpetuates the powerlessness of disadvantaged
individuals, groups, and communities, rendering it virtually impossible for such groups to
adequately raise their concerns and have their interests fairly represented.  See id.
132. See Brion, supra note 130, at 444.
133. See id.
134. See id.  On any given issue, the aggregate interest of the community may be significant,
yet individuals in the community will not participate because the cost of participation is so high
relative to their individual interests and because there is no mechanism in place to facilitate the
organization of their interests.  As a result, industry, for example, is frequently the only
participant.  Thus, the resulting participation does not accurately reflect the interests of those
affected by the decision.  See id. at 444-45.
135. See id. at 445.
136. See id.
137. See id.
profession, politicians do not begin to evaluate each issue from a
neutral stance.  Given their desire to remain in office, they are
inclined to cater to the constituencies that elected them.138
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, exhibit two strong biases:  to avoid
making controversial decisions and to expand their particular
department.139  Poor and minority communities lack economic and
political clout; therefore, they enjoy little influence over government
officials.140  Conversely, wealthier communities are better able to
influence and obtain favorable decisions from politicians since
politicians can more closely relate to the wealthier communities.141
The public choice process illustrates why economic and political
powerlessness is so detrimental to poor and minority communities.
Lacking political representation and influence, the powerlessness of
minority and poor communities creates and perpetuates the
disparate siting of LULUs and unequal enforcement of
environmental laws once a facility is sited.  Given the nature of the
public choice process, the only means of remedying this problem is
by increasing the political and economic influence of poor and
minority communities.  Community empowerment strategies are
aimed at accomplishing just this goal.
C. Transforming the Path of Least Resistance:  Community Empowerment
Strategies142
Community empowerment strategies are necessary because they
are the only means to adequately address and remedy the underlying
cause of environmental injustice—powerlessness.  To be effective,
however, these strategies must seek to accomplish three goals:
improving education; building the movement; and addressing the
                                                 
138. See id. at 443.  The role of a politician has been characterized as “constituent service.”
See id. at 443 n.26 (citing Fred Barnes, The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressman, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 1988, at 18 (noting that what a member of Congress does is
“euphemistically” called “constituent service,” which in reality is giving specific advantages to
individuals in the member’s district)).
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the NIMBY syndrome and its
consequences for poor and minority communities).
141. See id.
142. Although this Comment does not address public participation requirements in existing
environmental laws, it is important to note that any successful empowerment strategy will
involve the strategic use of public participation provisions.  Luke Cole argues that “strategic use
of public participation provisions in environmental laws can help relieve the environmental
burden of environmental dangers on low-income communities and communities of color, while
bringing those communities together to realize and exercise their collective power.”  Luke W.
Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists:  Three Models of Environmental
Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687, 689 (1995).  Cole then develops a participatory model
consisting of the following phases:  (1) the pre-application hearing, (2) the scoping meeting,
(3) the public comment period on the environmental impact assessment, and (4) the public
hearing held by the permitting agency to discuss public comments.  See id. at 695-97.  Each
phase presents an opportunity for public participation that should be exploited by the
community.  See id.  Utilizing public participation provisions is part and parcel of the
educational process that is a key element in any successful community empowerment strategy.
See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of education in
community empowerment strategies).
root-cause of the problem.143  The first objective focuses on two types
of education:  educating the community about a proposed land use;144
and educating the community that it must take power for itself.145
The second objective mandates the creation of an active community
group that will remain intact and active long after the problem at
issue is resolved.146  Finally, the third objective demands an effective
strategy that will address the root-cause of environmental injustice
and not merely a symptom of the problem.147
In short, community empowerment strategies seek to enable those
who face the consequences of environmental decisions be the ones
making the decisions.148  By educating and mobilizing communities,
these strategies attempt to remedy the inequitable results generated
by NIMBY and the normal functioning of the public choice process.149
The ultimate goal of community empowerment strategies is to create
numerous empowered communities that will coalesce into a
movement capable of exerting pressure on and affecting the personal
                                                 
143. These three goals are extrapolated from Luke Cole’s three models of environmental
advocacy.  The first model—the “professional model”—is attorney-centered and grounded in
the belief that the attorney is an expert who can best represent the interests of the community.
See Cole, supra note 142, at 693-94.  The second model—the “participatory model”—seeks to
maximize community involvement in the administrative permitting process.  See id. at 694.  The
participatory model accepts the system as it is and encourages participation in it.  See id. at 694-
97.  The third model—the “power model”—focuses on building power and is based on the
conviction that no amount of participation will change the power relations giving rise to
environmental degradation.  See id. at 698-700.  In evaluating the effectiveness of each model to
the environmental justice movement, Cole asks three questions:  (1) Will it educate?; (2) Will it
build the movement?; and (3) Will it address the root of the problem or merely a symptom?  See
id. at 703.
144. There are two principal types of education concerning a proposed land use.  First, a
community can obtain a copy of the environmental impact assessment (“EIA”), assign chapters
to each member, and meet to discuss what they learned from the EIA.  As Luke Cole points out,
a community’s knowledge and experience will often diverge from the “knowledge” contained in
the EIA.  See id. at 695-96.  Through these study groups, communities may be able to identify
serious flaws in the project or indicate alternatives for the project.  See id.  Second, a community
may simply begin researching the proposed facility to determine:  the type of facility it will be,
the nature of the pollutants it will discharge, and the harmfulness of those pollutants.  This type
of education is analogous to the education fostered in the Shintech case study discussed below.
See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing educational tactics used by the St.
James Citizens for Jobs and Environment community group).
145. This type of community education centers on self-determination, the power to control
one’s destiny.  See Cole, supra note 142, at 707.
146. See id. at 706 (arguing that merely mobilizing a number of community individuals is not
sufficient if the group cannot be maintained).
147. See id. at 698-99.  In other words, communities must identify and address the issues of
political and economic powerlessness by focusing on what empowerment strategies call the
“leverage point”—the decision.  See id. at 698.  Cole outlines the key questions that must be
asked in order to influence the decision-making process effectively:  (1) Who are the actual
decision-makers? (2) Where do the individual decision-makers stand on the project? (3) How
can the group neutralize or convert decisionmakers opposed to the group? (4) How can the
group solidify the support of decision-makers who favor the group? and (5) Who are the
group’s potential allies, both locally and regionally?  See id. at 699-700.
148. See Cole, supra note 9, at 661.  Inherent within this concept is the sentiment that those
who will be affected by the decision are imminently qualified to participate in the decision:  the
affected community’s “beliefs and experiences are as valid, or more valid, than those of the
traditional ‘experts’—scientists, consultants, attorneys—fielded by industry, government, and
environmental groups.”  See id. at 662.
149. Additionally, by mobilizing the community, these strategies decrease the prohibitive
costs associated with becoming involved in the public choice process.  See discussion supra Part
II.B (discussing the public choice process and its associated costs).
agendas of key decision-makers.150
                                                 
150. Because decision-makers typically discount individuals as insignificant, the formation of
a community group that provides collective action is crucial to success:  “[T]he atomistic
individual could accomplish little in isolation, but could accomplish great things when
organized into a group.”  Brion, supra note 130, at 452.  Additionally, by improving the chances
of successfully navigating the public choice process, community empowerment strategies
provide individuals in the community with a sense of personal efficacy, a crucial element in
political activism. See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 2.  By its nature, community empowerment
transforms personal efficacy into group efficacy, which enables communities to take charge of
the struggle, and eventually take charge of their respective communities.  This is precisely what
happened in the Civil Rights Movement.  Civil rights activists educated individuals about their
rights and the law, which led to the education of entire communities, which in turn empowered
individuals and communities to unite in a national movement that successfully exerted
significant pressure on politicians nationwide.  See infra Part III (discussing tactics used by the
Civil Rights Movement during the 1960s and their effectiveness in exerting pressure on
decision-makers).
D. Community Empowerment in Action:  St. James Citizens for Jobs and the
Environment—the Shintech, Inc. Controversy
The recent controversy in St. James Parish, Louisiana surrounding
the proposal by the Japanese firm, Shintech, Inc., to build a $700
million PVC plant in the predominantly black community provides
an excellent example of how and why community empowerment
strategies are effective.151  Controversy began virtually from the
moment citizens heard of the proposal.152  Despite protest, the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) initially
approved the requisite air permits for the plant.153  Citizens groups
subsequently filed petitions with the EPA requesting that the Agency
rescind the permits on environmental justice and technical
grounds.154  The environmental justice issue centers on whether the
siting of the plant in St. James Parish violates President Clinton’s
Executive Order.  The controversy was widely viewed as the EPA’s test
case for implementing the Executive Order.155
1. Formation of the community group St. James Citizens for Jobs and the
Environment
St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment (the “Group”) was
formed to provide a community voice in opposition to the siting of
                                                 
151. See generally Peter Fairley, Shintech Siting Dispute Awakens a Sleeping Giant, CHEMICAL WK.,
Oct. 8, 1997, at 45 (providing a brief summary of controversy surrounding the proposed
Shintech, Inc. plant).
152. There is significant disagreement, however, over whether the majority of the
population supports the plant.  In some door-to-door polls, surveyors report that as much as
73% of the black population is pro-Shintech.  See Environmentalists Seek to Make Shintech Delay
More Permanent, CHEMICAL MARKET REP., Sept. 22, 1997, at 5.  This fact seems to raise questions
about the application of environmental justice principles to the controversy:  How can it be
unjust if a majority of the population is pro-Shintech?  Furthermore, this situation has led some
to question the EPA’s reasoning behind using this controversy as a test case for its
environmental justice policies.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Not the Role of EPA, supra note 70, at B6
(“How can anyone claim the process has victimized black people when so many black people
favor the project?”); State NAACP Takes Pro-Shintech Stance, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept.
22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2551041 (noting that the majority of blacks favor the proposed
plant and criticizing Jesse Jackson for his opposition).
For the purposes of this Comment, whether or not the community is for or against Shintech
is irrelevant.  This Comment is concerned only with using the controversy to show the
effectiveness of community empowerment strategies.  The existence of this controversy presents
an excellent example of what an empowered community can accomplish.
153. See In re Shintech, Inc., Petition on Permit Nos. 2466-VO, 2467-VO, 2468-VO, at 2 (EPA
Sept. 10, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter In re Shintech
Order].
154. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing the environmental justice
petition and the petition for an adjudicatory hearing filed on behalf of St. James Citizens for
Jobs and Environment).
155. Robert Bullard calls the Shintech controversy the “quintessential environmental justice
struggle—a facility with ‘staggering’ permitted emissions proposed in a predominately black
location, chock full of plants, where poverty and unemployment are endemic.”  Fairley, supra
note 151, at 45 (quoting Robert Bullard); see also Vicki Ferstel, Shintech Becomes Test Case:  EPA
Trying to Apply New, Vague Order, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 12, 1997, at A1; Hoversten, supra
note 3, at A3; Carl Redman, Shintech Controversy Will Revisit Legislature, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Sept. 23, 1997, at B7.
the proposed Shintech, Inc. PVC plant.156  The Group is opposed to
the plant for several reasons.157  First, the Group believes the area is
presently overburdened with three chloride processing plants, an oil
refinery, a plastics plant, and other industries within a three-mile
radius of the proposed plant.158  Second, the plant would be located
within a mile of the local elementary school, raising concerns about
the condition of the school and whether it is adequate for “shelter-in-
place” warnings.159  Third, the Group believes that the promise of jobs
at the plant is an empty promise.160
2. The Group’s activities
The Group has been active in the community from the moment it
heard of the proposal.161  When news of the proposal first became
public, the Group organized and funded two informational
meetings.162  The Group distributed fliers about the meetings, placed
announcements in newspapers, and arranged transportation for
those who would otherwise not have been able to attend.163  The
purpose of these meetings was to obtain information from a diverse
                                                 
156. Letter from St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment (“SJC”), to Carol Browner,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 1 (Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter SJC
Letter] (on file with the American University Law Review).
157. See id.
158. See id.  As a result, the area ranks third highest in the state for total toxic releases and
transfers with more than 17 million pounds released or transferred yearly.  See Environmental
Justice Petition, supra note 1, at 9 (citing the 1994 TRI (Toxic Release Inventory) statistics).  In
addition, St. James ranks fourth in the state for toxic air releases, second for toxic water
releases, and in the top four for “special interest” toxic chemicals (chemicals that are of the
most concern because of their carcinogenic and/or teratogenic characteristics).  See id. at 9-10.
159. See SJC Letter, supra note 156, at 1.  “Shelter-in-place” warnings are alarms that warn of
accidental toxic releases into the air.  Residents are advised to stay in their homes during these
warnings.  See id.
160. The facts seem to support this argument.  Shintech requires a high school education
and technical skills.  See SJC Letter, supra note 156, at 5.  Pat Melancon, the Group’s leader,
claims that as much as 50% of the community has not completed high school and therefore
would not qualify for employment at the plant.  See id.  In the Group’s letter to the EPA
Administrator Carol Browner, Melancon wrote:  “[T]he jobs promise is a callous one that tells
people who have been historically discriminated against, denied educational opportunities, and
thought to be without political power, to sacrifice their health and environment and the health
of their children for the promise of a job.”  Id.  Additionally, members of the Group oppose the
plant because they feel the creation of only 165 jobs does not justify further environmental
degradation.  See, e.g., Editorial, Are Shintech’s Jobs Worth It?, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 10,
1997, at B10 (asking whether “165 permanent jobs are worth the tons of toxic poison and
danger to our elderly and our children who can’t protect themselves or escape”).
In fairness to Shintech, the company said that it would work with a local technical college to
help residents gain the skills necessary to compete for jobs at the plant.  See Chris Gray, Shintech
Getting Good Reviews in Texas:  Company Wants St. James Site, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug.
31, 1997, at A1.  Pursuant to this offer, and as part of an agreement with the St. James chapter
of the NAACP, Shintech pledged $500,000 to fund a nonprofit corporation for improving job
training and creating small businesses in St. James, if and when it obtains the necessary permits
for the plant.  See Vicki Ferstel, Shintech, Inc. Offered Help on Jobs, Businesses, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., Dec. 16, 1997, at A1; Chris Gray, Shintech Promises Training for Workers, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Gray, Training for Workers].  The program
does not guarantee jobs, but will focus on providing job training.  See Gray, Training for Workers,
supra at B3.  In its agreement with the local NAACP, the company also resolved to implement
an affirmative action plan in its hiring practices.  See Hoversten, supra note 3, at A3.
161. See SJC Letter, supra note 156, at 4-5.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1.
group of people164 and to encourage “open and frank” discussion
about the pros and cons of the proposal, including economic, health,
and environmental impacts.165  In addition to organizing
informational meetings, the Group widely advertised the LDEQ’s
public hearing on the Shintech air permits.166
The Group also educated itself about the plant’s operating
procedures and the vinyl chloride, dioxin, and other hazardous
materials that the plant would produce.167  Likewise, in an effort to
understand better their rights under existing law, the Group studied
the permitting process and regulatory actions by the LDEQ and the
EPA.168  Through these efforts, the Group has sought to influence the
decision-making process and ensure that the community’s interests
and concerns are fully considered in the permitting process.169
3. Results of the Group’s efforts
In response to the Group’s protests, the filing of an environmental
justice petition with the EPA on April 2, 1997,170 and a request for an
adjudicatory hearing with the LDEQ on May 15, 1997,171 the Group
achieved several successes.  First, on September 8, 1997, J. Dale
                                                 
164. See id. (explaining that the Group invited the Vice-President of Shintech, the Parish
President, and various environmental organizations).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 6.  The Group mobilized 300 people to attend the meeting and gathered over
1000 signatures during the public comment period on the permit applications.  See id.  The flier
the Group created for the public hearing included information about how the hearing would
proceed, how citizens could voice their concerns, and a brief explanation about the amount of
pollution the plant would release.  See St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment Flier,
Right To Know (copy on file with the American University Law Review).
167. See SJC Letter, supra note 156, at 5.
168. See id.
169. In the Group’s letter to Carol Browner, Melancon writes:
[W]e have taken the responsibility to fully participate in the Shintech permitting
decision.  At every opportunity made available to us, we have gathered information,
researched issues, actively encouraged residents to participate in the decision-making
process, and voiced our concerns about the types of pollution and associated health
risks that Shintech [would] bring to our community.
SJC Letter, supra note 156, at 5.
170. The Tulane Environmental Law Clinic filed the petition on behalf of the Group and
other local community-based organizations concerned with the proposed plant.  The
environmental justice petition states three reasons why the EPA should object to the Shintech
permits.  First, the plant would constitute a major new source that would increase the
“disproportionately high health and environmental risks that are adverse to the predominately
African-American and low-income community.”  See Environmental Justice Petition, supra note
1, at 2.  Second, the permit fails to meet regulatory standards for minimizing the consequences
of an accidental release.  See id.  Third, there has been no demonstration that the benefits of the
proposed plant would outweigh the substantial environmental and social costs imposed on
residents in and outside the community.  See id.
171. The request for an adjudicatory hearing states three reasons why the LDEQ should
reopen the permitting process and hold another public meeting.  First, the LDEQ failed to
address adequately environmental justice issues relating to the site selection and permitting
process.  See Letter from Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Dr. Clarice E. Gaylord, Director,
Office of Environmental Justice, U.S. EPA 1 (May 15, 1997) (on file with the American University
Law Review) (requesting an adjudicatory hearing regarding the Shintech air permit
proceedings).  Second, the LDEQ would have to grant Shintech an adjudicatory hearing if it
requested one and it would be unfair to deny concerned citizens the same opportunity.  See id.
Third, the hearing is necessary to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights to a fair public review
and comment period and an impartial and unbiased decision.  See id. at 2.
Givens, Secretary of the LDEQ, reopened the permitting process to
enable further dialogue between the LDEQ and concerned citizens,
and to address potential environmental justice issues.172  Second, on
September 10, 1997, EPA Administrator Carol Browner rejected
Shintech’s air permit on technical grounds—for its failure to regulate
all potential sources of pollution.173  The Agency, however, failed to
act explicitly on the environmental justice issues,174 instead leaving
them to the LDEQ to address in the reopened permitting process.175
Third, on September 17, 1998 Shintech announced that it was
suspending plans to build the PVC plant in St. James Parish.176
Instead, it plans to build a smaller, $250 million plant near
Plaquemine, Louisiana.177  Perhaps most importantly, to avoid the
                                                 
172. See Letter from J. Dale Givens, Secretary of the LDEQ, to Jerry Clifford, EPA Region VI
Administrator 1 (Sept. 8, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review).  In the letter,
Givens said the reopened process would enable the LDEQ to address issues that may involve
environmental justice and provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act concerning disparate
impact on the surrounding community.  See id.
On December 9, 1997, Louisiana became the first state to hold a public meeting on
environmental justice issues.  See Maria Giordano, Shintech Forum to Focus on Racism:  St. James
Meeting First of its Kind, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8, 1997, at A1.  The LDEQ
scheduled two such meetings to provide citizens an opportunity to discuss whether the
Shintech, Inc. plant will disproportionately affect the predominantly minority communities
near the proposed site.  See id.  Additionally, the meetings are an effort by the LDEQ and the
EPA to more precisely define the term “environmental justice.”  See id.
173. In re Shintech Order, supra note 153, at 5-6.
174. In not acting explicitly on the environmental justice issues raised, Browner adopted the
reasoning of the Environmental Appeals Board in In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana,
Inc.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  In rejecting the petition, Browner stated that “a
petitioner must demonstrate that a permit is not in compliance with applicable requirements of
the Act.” In re Shintech Order, supra note 153, at 5.  In essence, the petition was rejected on the
ground that the Clean Air Act does not authorize petitioning the EPA to revoke a permit for
environmental justice reasons.  Instead, the Act mandates that petitioners show that a permit is
not in compliance with a Clean Air Act requirement.  See id. at 8 (“Petitioners have not shown
how their particular environmental justice concerns demonstrate that the Shintech Permits
[sic] do not comply with applicable requirements of the [Clean Air] Act.”).  Therefore,
Browner was forced to find a “technical” violation of a Clean Air Act requirement in order to
revoke the permits.
175. In a letter to J. Dale Givens explaining the EPA’s decision, Browner made it clear that
the Agency would step in if it was not satisfied with the LDEQ’s handling of the environmental
justice issue.  See Letter from Carol Browner, EPA Administrator, to J. Dale Givens, Secretary of
the LDEQ 1-2 (Sept. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Letter from Carol Browner] (on file with the
American University Law Review).  Additionally, the letter says that the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights
will continue looking into the Title VI claims raised.  See id. at 2.  The EPA’s decision on the
environmental justice issues may have been influenced by the LDEQ’s decision on September 8,
1997, to reopen the permitting process to address, inter alia, environmental justice issues.  In
her letter, Browner stated that she is pleased with the LDEQ’s decision to reopen the process
and emphasized the EPA’s belief that “it is essential that minority and low income communities
not be disproportionately subjected to environmental hazards, and that the concerns of their
residents be adequately addressed in the permitting process.”  See id. at 1.
176. See Vicki Ferstel & Chris Frink, Shintech Withdraws Plan:  EPA Official Praises Shintech
Plan, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 18, 1998, at 1A.
177. See Shintech Plans PVC Plant to Replace Vinyls Complex, CHEMICAL MARKET REP., Sept. 28,
1998, at 5.  Unlike St. James Parish, which has a predominately black population, the
population of Iberville Parish, where Plaquemine is located, is almost evenly divided between
whites and blacks and has higher relative income levels than St. James.  Bob Kuehn, director of
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, however, argues that this demographic difference may
be traced to 1991 when Dow Chemicals relocated the predominately black community of
Morrisonville.  See “Environmental Racism” Case Not Over; Company’s Decision on Plant Site Doesn’t
End EPA Scrutiny, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19, 1998, at 33A; see also supra note 2 (discussing
the four towns that have “disappeared” along the Mississippi river over the past several years).
“firestorm” it encountered in St. James Parish, Shintech conducted a
series of public meetings with residents in the parishes surrounding
the newly proposed plant to identify issues that the company should
address when it submits its new permit applications.178
These results are both discouraging and encouraging.  They are
discouraging because in its test case for environmental justice, the
EPA ultimately left the decision to the LDEQ.179  On the other hand,
the results are encouraging because community involvement and
pressure clearly influenced the decision-making process, as shown by
the LDEQ’s decision to reopen the permitting process, and
Shintech’s decision to relocate its plant and conduct public meetings
at the new location before submitting its permit application. 180
4. Assessing the effectiveness of the Group’s tactics
To assess the Group’s effectiveness, one must examine whether its
actions accomplished the three goals of community empowerment
strategies:  increasing education; building the movement; and
addressing the root-cause of environmental injustice.181  Arguably, all
three have been accomplished.  First, the tactics clearly educated the
community.182  The Group researched relevant issues, identified their
rights and how they could participate in the process, and also learned
about the plant’s production processes and the nature of the toxins
that would be released.183
Second, the Group’s efforts have helped build a movement.184  By
organizing meetings and posting notices about the LDEQ public
hearings, the Group encouraged more people to attend and join the
efforts to block the plant.185  Additionally, the Group’s efforts
attracted national186 and international attention187 and the Group
                                                 
178. See Mark Schleifstein, Shintech Takes New Tack With Residents, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 7, 1998, at A2.  The first meeting took place on September 23, 1998, and was
attended by approximately 200 Iberville Parish residents.  See Amy Reynolds, People Talk of Fears
with Shintech, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 24, 1998, at A4.  At the third public meeting, October
7, 1998, Shintech officials presented residents with a 33-page report providing written answers
to over 400 questions posed at the previous two meetings.  See Chris Frink, Report Offers Answers
to Shintech Plant Questions, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 7, 1998, at B4.  In addition, the report
was sent to public libraries and people who requested copies.  See id.
179. Luke Cole described the EPA’s handling of the situation:  “They punted pretty badly—
spineless as usual from the Browner administration.”  Fairley, supra note 151, at 45.
180. See infra Part II.D.4.
181. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (presenting Cole’s three goals of community
empowerment strategies).
182. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (discussing educational methods
employed by Group).
183. See id.
184. Not only have the Group’s efforts mobilized and empowered the local community, but
they have become a rallying point for the environmental justice movement.  Even the LDEQ
Secretary J. Dale Givens recognizes that “Shintech is the pawn that’s on the table now, but I
think you’ll see more of it across the country.”  See Fairley, supra note 151, at 45.
185. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Group’s efforts to gain
community support).
186. For example, U.S. Representative John Conyers of Michigan., vowed to campaign
against the proposed Shintech plant so heavily that Louisiana voters “would think I was here
running for Congress.”  See David Mastio, Revolt Brews Against EPA, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 18,
gained the support of influential national public interest groups such
as Greenpeace.188
Third, the Group’s efforts have profoundly affected decision-
makers.  In her letter to the LDEQ Secretary J. Dale Givens, EPA
Administrator Carol Browner stressed that the EPA felt it was
essential that the concerns of the residents be adequately addressed
in the permitting process.189  Similarly, in her speech to the
Congressional Black Caucus the day after rejecting the Shintech air
permits, Browner explained that “I took this action, in part, because
the local residents convinced us . . . that their concerns about being
disproportionately subjected to environmental hazards were not
being adequately addressed.”190
At the local level, the Group’s efforts spawned two environmental
justice laws191 and played a role in Shintech’s decision to suspend
plans for building its plant in St. James Parish and to hold public
meetings prior to submitting its permit application for its newly
proposed plant in Plaquemine.192  By influencing the decision-making
process, the Group’s tactics addressed the root-cause of
environmental injustice—the powerlessness of minority and poor
communities.
III. COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES ARE THE ANSWER
The outcome of the Shintech controversy demonstrates the efficacy
                                                 
1998, at B1.
187. See, e.g., Hoversten, supra note 3, at A3; U.S. Suspends Permit of Japanese Firm to Build
Plastics Factory, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 19, 1997, at B2.
188. Additionally, the Civil Justice Foundation, operated by the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America, awarded a $10,000 grant to assist the Group.  See Mike Dunne, Lawyers’ Grant Helps
Shintech Foes, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 1, 1997, at B5 (discussing the Group as
a “test case” for the success of environmental justice movement).
189. See Letter from Carol Browner, supra note 175, at 1.
190. EPA Administrator Carol Browner, Address at the Congressional Black Caucus
Environmental Justice Forum (Sept. 11, 1997).  This remark is interesting given that in her
Order responding to the Group’s petition, Browner simply said the permits were denied for
technical reasons, namely, the failure to regulate all potential sources of pollution.  See supra
notes 173-74 (discussing Browner’s ruling in In re Shintech Order).  Nonetheless, the ruling
demonstrates the political pressure exerted on the EPA by the Group’s activities.  Although the
permits were rejected on “technical” grounds, the environmental justice issues clearly played a
role in the final decision.  The Group’s efforts may explain why the Agency thoroughly
researched the Clean Air Act’s requirements and Shintech’s permit application in order to find
the “technical” grounds on which to reject the permit.
191. See Redman, supra note 155, at B7.  These laws are especially significant because they
were introduced by state Rep. Roy Quezaire, whose legislative district includes a large section of
St. James Parish.  See id.  The first law mandates that people living or working near proposed
industrial sites be given the first opportunity to voice their opinions at public meetings on
permit applications.  See id.  The second law mandates that the LDEQ study the relationship
between industrial pollution and the communities surrounding the polluters.  See id.
Significantly, however, the second bill was substantially watered-down from Rep. Quezaire’s
original proposal calling for a complete study of the environmental justice issue, specifically
whether polluters tend to be located in poor or minority neighborhoods.  See id.  Nevertheless,
the proposal and passage of two bills demonstrate the effectiveness of the Group’s tactics in
influencing the decision-making process.
192. See Mark Schleifstein, Outcry Alone Didn’t Alter Shintech Plan; Market Shifts Motivating Move
to Plaquemine, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 19, 1998, at A1 (noting that community
opposition was one factor in Shintech’s decision to relocate).
of community empowerment strategies.  The actions taken by the St.
James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment accomplished the goals
of community empowerment strategies, and as a result, the Group
was able to influence the decision-making process.  Although this
outcome may have been the ideal, a less favorable outcome for the
citizens of St. James would not mean that community empowerment
strategies are ineffective.  Empowerment strategies are effective
because their ultimate goal is to win the war against social injustice.
The outcome of any particular battle, while important for those
involved, is not important in terms of the final goal, social justice.193
Empowerment strategies focus on building a movement ultimately
capable of exerting pressure on decision-makers.194  The building of a
movement is a gradual process, likely replete with set-backs.195  The
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s provides an excellent example of
this gradual process.  Efforts by individuals like Rosa Parks196 and four
                                                 
193. See Judith E. Koons, Fair Housing and Community Empowerment:  Where the Roof Meets
Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 75, 80 (1996) (noting that the goal of
empowerment may be accorded a long-term view that resists a win or lose approach).  In fact,
often a defeat in one community is ultimately beneficial for the movement as a whole.  See
BULLARD, supra note 2, at 45.  An excellent example is the attempt by local residents in Warren
County, North Carolina, in 1982, to block the siting of a PCB landfill in their economically
depressed and overwhelmingly black community.  See id.  In what is widely hailed as the birth of
the environmental justice movement, citizens of Warren County formed the Warren County
Citizens Concerned About PCBs to protest the proposed landfill.  See id.  The group was joined
by national civil rights leaders, black elected officials, environmental activists, and labor leaders.
See id.  Although the protests ultimately failed, they brought national attention to
environmental justice issues and led to the 1983 GAO study of hazardous waste landfill siting
and the 1987 UCC study on toxic wastes and race  See id.; see also supra note 5 (describing the
details of the 1983 GAO study and 1987 UCC study).  The two studies are cited consistently to
show the disproportionate impact of environmental laws on poor and minority communities.
See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 33-36 (discussing the historical background of environmental
problems facing black communities).
194. Community empowerment strategies utilize a three-part approach to achieve their
ultimate goal.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 2.  The first part is individual empowerment.  See id.
This leads to the second part, community empowerment, which leads to the third part, the
national movement.  See id.
The basis for this evolution is the development of a sense of personal efficacy among
individuals in the community.  See id.  Addressing the importance of personal efficacy, Robert
Bullard discusses two types of “coping” strategies employed by blacks when confronted with a
“stressor”:  problem-focused coping (efforts to address the problem directly); and emotion-
focused coping (tolerating the stressor).  See id.  Bullard argues that the decision to take direct
action or to tolerate a stressor often depends on how individuals perceive their ability to do
something about the situation.  See id.  Through their emphasis on education and community
involvement, community empowerment strategies are primarily designed to create this sense of
personal efficacy that will encourage and enable disadvantaged individuals to take direct action
as part of a community, and later, as a broad-based movement.  The situations involving Rosa
Parks and the Four North Carolina A&T students provide excellent examples of this
progression.  See infra notes 196-96.
195. See, e.g., Coyle supra note 90, at S8 (noting that the Civil Rights Movement faced
repeated failures in the areas of voting rights, housing, and school desegregation before
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
196. The incident involving Rosa Parks is an excellent illustration of the importance of
personal efficacy in political activism.  Just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Reverend Vernon Johns sat in the “white” section of
a Montgomery, Alabama bus.  See ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND 14 (1990).  When
ordered off the bus, Johns stood and asked who would be leaving with him.  See id.  Nobody
responded.  See id.  A few days later, Johns scolded a woman who had declined his request.  See
id.  She responded:  “You ought to knowed better.”  See id.
Roughly eighteen months after the Brown decision, on December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks refused
North Carolina A&T students197 to change the prejudiced political
system began with only a few supporters, but gradually spread from
town to town across the South.  As entire communities began taking
part, a national movement was born that ultimately resulted in the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.198
A. The Civil Rights Movement
The main goals of the Civil Rights Movement were to mobilize
communities to bring about social justice, equal protection, and an
end to institutional discrimination.199  The environmental justice
movement has the same goals.200  As such, it is useful to examine the
strategies employed by the Civil Rights Movement and evaluate them
within the empowerment model.
1. Tactics employed by the Civil Rights Movement
Four principal tactics were employed by the Civil Rights Movement
in its quest for social justice.  The first tactic was litigation.201  Black
activists used the legal system to chip away gradually at school
                                                 
to give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama.  See id.  The bus driver called the police
and Parks was arrested.  See id.  Unlike the situation with Reverend Johns, the people of
Montgomery did not say "you should have known better" to Rosa Parks.  See id. Instead, they
began organizing against the bus company, the city government, and the Jim Crow laws.  See id.
(noting the rapid response to Parks’ arrest within the black community).
The decision in Brown likely played a crucial role in the dramatically different responses to
the actions of Reverend Johns and Rosa Parks.  After Brown, the black community may have
believed it could truly accomplish something and furthermore, it had a Supreme Court
decision saying that segregation and separate but equal were no longer acceptable to back it up.
The Brown decision may have given Rosa Parks and others the strength to defy racist laws and
work towards their repeal.
197. The actions of the four North Carolina A & T students are especially illustrative of the
gradual evolution of a movement.  On February 1, 1960, four black students sought service at
the local Woolworth’s “white” lunch counter.  See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 3.  Though they
failed to receive service that first day, they returned to campus as heroes.  See id.  The next day,
they were joined by twenty people; by the fourth day, white students were joining them, and
within a week, the protests had spread across state lines.  See id. at 18-19.  Weisbrot recounts how
these initial sit-ins led people to believe that they could also protest in their communities and
effect change.  See id. at 19.  The thousands of people who began challenging the color line
knew that the “the actions of these four freshman ‘had something to do with [their] own
li[ves].’”  See id.  This is an illustration of how empowered individuals who come together to
form an empowered community can incite a national movement centered around promoting
their interests.
198. See generally WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 1-18 (discussing how the Civil Rights
Movement advanced gradually, securing small gains over decades).
199. See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 3 (presenting the overriding goals of the Civil Rights
Movement).
200. See, e.g., BRYANT, supra note 8, at 66 (“[T]he principles of the environmental justice
movement include not only equal protection from environmental risks, or life and health
issues, but also the right for people to live in communities that are environmentally safe,
regardless of their race or income.”); BULLARD, supra note 10, at 267 (contending that
environmental issues for minority communities are reflective of environmental racism and
often linked to other social justice issues relating to jobs, housing, and crime).  Bullard asserts
that the environmental issues “are viewed [by minorities] as part of the broader picture of race-
based social inequity.”  Id.
201. See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 10; see also infra note 203 (considering Brown v. Board
of Education).
segregation and Jim Crow laws;202 eventually achieving school
desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.203
The second principal tactic was the use of mass meetings.204  These
meetings usually convened in churches and were places where
participants could express their emotions and formulate strategies.205
The emotional expressions at these meetings became a way of
channeling fear and rage into positive collective action.206
The third tactic took the form of mass protest actions such as
marches or sit-ins.207  Both were designed to rally community support
and bring attention to the movement’s cause.208  Marches were
especially effective at showing black solidarity and serving as a means
for demanding reform and federal action.209
A fourth, and less well-known, tactic was the establishment of
citizenship schools.210  These schools focused on racial matters,
holding interracial meetings and workshops that dealt with race
                                                 
202. See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 10.
203. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the doctrine of separate but equal has no place
in the field of public education).
204. See RICHARD A. KING, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF FREEEDOM 41 (1992) (analyzing
the function of the mass meeting and its emotional effect on participants).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 138-39 (1980) (tracing the purpose
and effect of sit-ins and their role in achieving black equality); WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 38-
39.
208. William H. Chafe provides an excellent description of the effectiveness of the sit-in:
[T]he fundamental contribution of the sit-ins was to provide a new form through
which protest could be expressed.  The very act of sitting-in circumvented those forms
of fraudulent communication and self-deception through which whites had historically
denied black self-assertion.  The sit-ins represented a new language.  Moreover, the
language communicated a message different from that which had been heard
before. . . .  In an almost visceral way, the sit-ins expressed the dissatisfaction and anger
of the black community . . . [the protest] was expressed in a manner that whites could
not possibly ignore— the silence of people sitting with dignity at a lunch counter
demanding their rights. . . . the message was different because for the first time, whites
could not avoid hearing it.
CHAFE, supra note 207, at 138-39.
An excellent example of the effectiveness of mass protests in general occurred in the spring
of 1960 in Nashville, Tennessee.  In late April an explosion demolished the home of a black
attorney who represented student protesters and knocked out the windows of a medical school
across the street.  See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 38.  After the bombing, two thousand people
marched to the steps of City Hall.  See id. at 39.  The mayor quickly formed a bi-racial committee
to help end the conflict.  See id.  The committee recommended the gradual desegregation of
downtown stores and the mayor complied.  See id.  On May 10, 1960, four theaters and six lunch
counters opened their doors to blacks.  See id.
209. See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 79 (asserting that the national protest movements
were an effective means to influence the federal government).  The most memorable and
effective of these marches was the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom held on August
28, 1963, when more than 200,000 blacks and whites gathered at the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington, DC, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his “I have a dream” speech.  See id.
at 82-83.  The march had a profound impact on President Kennedy.  See id.  Prior to the march
and rally, Kennedy had endorsed its objectives, but was wary of possible violence that could
discredit the movement.  See id. at 83.  Afterward, however, Kennedy lauded the “fervor” and
“dignity” of the participants and invited ten of the main organizers to the White House for a
reception.  Id.
210. Citizenship schools were originally established in Grundy County in East Tennessee as
centers for training union organizers.  See KING, supra note 204, at 42.  In the 1950s, the schools
changed their focus to racial matters.  See id.
relations, political education, and leadership training.211
2. Evaluating these tactics within the empowerment model
The tactics employed by the Civil Rights Movement accomplished
the three goals of empowerment strategies.  First, they educated the
community.  Through institutions like citizenship schools, blacks
learned to read, learned of their rights, and learned how the
government operated.212  Similarly, activities like marches and sit-ins
enabled blacks to take control of the struggle.213  Second, the tactics
helped build a movement.  Sit-ins and marches were extremely
effective at building local support that spilled over into town after
town.214  Likewise, public meetings were an effective means of
channeling individual feelings into collective action.215  Third, the
tactics sought to remedy the root-cause of social injustice.216  Through
unified action, blacks were able to place significant pressure on local
and national politicians,217 ultimately culminating in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.218
CONCLUSION:  LEARNING FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The Civil Rights Movement demonstrates that community
empowerment strategies are an effective means of overcoming
powerlessness.  The tactics employed by the Civil Rights Movement
empowered individuals, communities, and ultimately, a national
movement.219  To succeed, the environmental justice movement must
                                                 
211. See id.  Between 1957 and 1970, 897 citizenship schools were established.  See id. at 43.
212. See id.  The typical procedure was to train teachers at citizenship schools so that they
could return to their communities and educate others.  See id.
213. As Richard King observes, the “forms of action . . . expressed a determination to seize
the initiative in formulating goals and strategies away from local white and black elites.”  KING,
supra note 204, at 40.  Likewise, Myles Horton, founder of the citizenship schools, stressed that
the “burden and the responsibility is on the whites, but the burden of change is on the blacks.”
See id. at 43.
214. See supra note 197 (discussing the effectiveness of the lunch-counter sit-in at
Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North Carolina).
215. See KING, supra note 204 at 41 (noting that the psychological function of mass meeting
was not just cathartic, it also encouraged action).
216. See WEISBROT, supra note 196, at 314.
217. Weisbrot observes that during the height of the Civil Rights Movement, blacks “shook
whole cities with mass demonstrations, demanded and secured sweeping changes in federal law,
and reshaped the political agenda of two strong-minded chief executives (President Kennedy
and President Johnson).”  See id.
218. Gaining the right to vote meant that politicians would now have to court the black
constituency in order to win elections.  George Wallace’s 1982 gubernatorial campaign is an
excellent example of this “political calculation.”  See id.  Weisbrot notes that Wallace, the
“master of race baiting,” was struck color-blind in the 1982 election.  See id.  Because his goal
was to be elected governor, Wallace spent much of his campaign “kissing black babies” and
assuring the black electorate of his new attitude on racial matters.  See id. at 316.
219. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text (evaluating the tactics of the Civil Rights
Movement within the empowerment model).  Through such empowerment, the movement left
an indelible mark on its participants.  A newspaper editor in Albany, Georgia commented:  “We
won self-respect.  It changed all my attitudes.  This movement made me demand a semblance of
first-class citizenship.”  KING, supra note 204, at 56.  This self-respect was, in turn, often
expressed in the rhetoric of freedom and empowerment.  One participant recalls how she
ceased to “respect boundaries that put me down . . . I was empowered by the civil rights
movement.”  See id.  In light of such changes, King observed that “a new sense of personhood
do the same.  Although specific tactics may differ,220 the underlying
concept of empowering individuals to take control of the struggle for
themselves should be at the core of any environmental justice
strategy.221
In fact, any empowerment strategies adopted by the environmental
justice movement stand a better chance of success than those
embraced by the Civil Rights Movement.  First, black communities
have in place many of the institutions established during the Civil
Rights Movement.222  Second, because they have experience with
collective action through various community groups and institutions,
minority communities may be more responsive to organization
efforts.223  Third, through institutions such as the Congressional Black
                                                 
emerged from the process of overcoming personal nullity and acting with others to create a
political community.”  Id. at 57.
220. The greatest difference in tactics will likely be the use of litigation strategies.  Although
litigation strategies were extremely successful for the Civil Rights Movement, their efficacy in
the environmental justice context remains questionable given the difficulties of proving
discriminatory intent and the uncertain viability of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  See supra
notes 20-41, 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties surrounding the use of
litigation to remedy perceived environmental injustices and how litigation strategies may work
to communities’ disadvantage).  Although the environmental justice movement may be unable
to use the courts, it may still work within the system by utilizing the various public participation
provisions in environmental statutes and by bringing administrative Title VI claims, a luxury the
Civil Rights Movement did not enjoy.
The greatest similarity in tactics is the emphasis on education.  The Civil Rights Movement
educated its members through citizenship schools and mass-meetings.  See WEISBROT, supra note
196, at 38.  Similarly, St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment has devoted substantial
resources to educating citizens about their rights and funding public meetings.  See supra notes
161-68 and accompanying text.
221. A study conducted by Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant illustrates the importance of
community empowerment strategies.  In their study, Mohai and Bryant examined the awareness
of Detroit area residents regarding environmental injustices.  See Mohai & Bryant, supra note
100, at 930.  One of the questions posed to residents was “[w]hether they felt politics rather
than science played a more critical role in  selecting a site for a new waste facility.”  Id.  A
majority of both blacks and whites (58% for each) believed that community opposition played a
more significant role in siting decisions than scientific criteria.  See id. at 931.
222. Robert Bullard observes that many blacks are affiliated with civic clubs, neighborhood
associations, community improvement groups and other institutions that have track records of
opposition to social injustice and racial discrimination.  See BULLARD, supra note 2, at 18
(discussing these affiliations and the growing concern with environmental problems in black
communities).  As these institutions are experienced in fighting social injustices, they are
readily transferable to the environmental justice movement.  Additionally, much of the
leadership in the Civil Rights Movement came from historically black colleges and universities
(“HBCUs”).  See id. at 3.  Bullard notes that many of these HBCUs are located in some of the
most polluted communities in the country.  See id.  As such, these institutions have a vested
interest in improving their community’s environmental safety.  Id. at 4.  Thus, HBCUs may once
again play a central role in a movement for social justice.  Id.  Similarly, Aldon D. Morris, a
black sociologist, argues that the black community possesses “(1) certain basic resources; (2)
social activists with strong ties to mass-based indigenous institutions; (3) tactics and strategies
that can be effectively employed against a system of domination.”  Id. at 16 (quoting ALDON D.
MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 282 (1984)).  This plethora of local
minority social action groups, together with national organizations such as the NAACP and
HBCUs, illustrates that the infrastructure for an environmental justice movement is already in
place.
223. See BULLARD, supra note 10, at 62.  Furthermore, Regina Austin and Michael Schill
argue that “shared criticisms of racism, a distrust of corporate power, and little expectation that
government will be responsive to their complaints are common sentiments in communities of
color and support the call to action around environmental concerns.”  See id.  Similarly, in
describing the origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Aldon D. Morris wrote:
The tradition of protest is transmitted across generations by older relatives, black
Caucus, environmental justice advocates are better able to attract the
government’s attention to the interests and concerns of minority
communities.224  Finally, the President has already involved himself in
the environmental justice debate through Executive Order 12,898,
thus providing the movement with a degree of national legitimacy.
The Shintech controversy is a solid foundation on which the
environmental justice movement can build.  Through their
organization, education, and legal efforts, the citizens of St. James
Parish were able to address the inequities of the public choice
process.  Their participation not only ensured that the community’s
concerns were heard but that decisions were made on the basis of
complete information.  Through these efforts, the citizens of St.
James Parish gained a voice in the decision-making process.  This is
the goal of community empowerment strategies.  Thus, the Shintech
controversy demonstrates that the strategies employed by the Civil
Rights Movement are just as effective today as they were almost forty
years ago.
                                                 
institutions, churches, and protest organizations.  Blacks interested in social change
inevitably gravitate to this “protest community,” where they hope to find solutions to a
complex problem.
The modern Civil Rights Movement fits solidly into this rich tradition of protest.
BULLARD, supra note 2, at 3.  The present day environmental justice movement also fits “solidly
within this rich tradition of protest.”  See id.
224. Perhaps most importantly, the Congressional Black Caucus gives blacks an increasingly
powerful voice in the upper echelons of government.  At a minimum, such organizations force
governmental agencies to justify programs that affect minorities.  Carol Browner’s speech at the
Congressional Black Caucus’ Environmental Justice Forum the day after delivering her decision
in the Shintech case demonstrates this.  See supra note 190 (stating that EPA is committed to
achieving environmental justice and that Shintech air permits were denied, in part, because of
citizen petitions).
